Executive interference and the erosion of the rule of law: a comparative study of the prosecution of official corruption offences in Nigeria, South Africa, and the United States of America
type: CreativeWork
description: Executive interference in prosecuting official corruption offences erodes the rule of law, threatening democratic integrity and governance. This thesis examines this erosion in Nigeria, South Africa, and the United States of America through a comparative doctrinal study, analysing how constitutional sociology, political economy, cultural politics, and political cultures shape interference. Three hypotheses guide the research: in Nigeria, centralised control and military-shaped tolerance drive executive interference and undermine prosecutorial independence; in South Africa, state capture and an emergent democratic culture with racial nuances facilitate executive interference and weaken prosecutorial autonomy; and in the United States of America, presidential pardons and increasing executive pressure disrupt accountability and undermine prosecutorial independence. Drawing on statutes, legal texts, case law, and secondary sources, the study reveals distinct interference mechanisms—Nigeria's Attorney General discretion and presidential pardons, South Africa's political pressure and state capture, and the United States of America's presidential pardons and political pressure—fracturing prosecutorial independence, equality and impartiality, thus breaching the promise of resource protection under the social contract. Findings highlight that constitutional design, economic incentives, cultural practices, and societal attitudes drive this interference, leading to the erosion of the rule of law, distrust of government and the depletion of state resources. The absence of robust prosecutorial autonomy exacerbates interference, varying by Nigeria's post-military legacy, South Africa's transitional pluralism, and the United States of America's use of presidential pardons and recent executive overt hostility to the prosecution. Recommendations propose independent prosecutorial bodies, oversight mechanisms, and public accountability measures to strengthen the rule of law, deepen th…
abstract: Executive interference in prosecuting official corruption offences erodes the rule of law, threatening democratic integrity and governance. This thesis examines this erosion in Nigeria, South Africa, and the United States of America through a comparative doctrinal study, analysing how constitutional sociology, political economy, cultural politics, and political cultures shape interference. Three hypotheses guide the research: in Nigeria, centralised control and military-shaped tolerance drive executive interference and undermine prosecutorial independence; in South Africa, state capture and an emergent democratic culture with racial nuances facilitate executive interference and weaken prosecutorial autonomy; and in the United States of America, presidential pardons and increasing executive pressure disrupt accountability and undermine prosecutorial independence. Drawing on statutes, legal texts, case law, and secondary sources, the study reveals distinct interference mechanisms—Nigeria's Attorney General discretion and presidential pardons, South Africa's political pressure and state capture, and the United States of America's presidential pardons and political pressure—fracturing prosecutorial independence, equality and impartiality, thus breaching the promise of resource protection under the social contract. Findings highlight that constitutional design, economic incentives, cultural practices, and societal attitudes drive this interference, leading to the erosion of the rule of law, distrust of government and the depletion of state resources. The absence of robust prosecutorial autonomy exacerbates interference, varying by Nigeria's post-military legacy, South Africa's transitional pluralism, and the United States of America's use of presidential pardons and recent executive overt hostility to the prosecution. Recommendations propose independent prosecutorial bodies, oversight mechanisms, and public accountability measures to strengthen the rule of law, deepen th…
author: Uchegbune, Temple Chinedum
language: en
keywords: official corruption, rule of law, separation of powers, prosecutorial independence and discretion, social contract, constitutional sociology, political economy, cultural politics, political culture
date published: 2025
date modified: 2026-07-22T22:23:42Z
provider: University of Cape Town
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: Department of Public Law

PropertyValue
property ID: Handle
value: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/42730