More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture

Before South Africa's current constitutional dispensation, the apartheid government, through its parliamentary sovereignty mode of governance, did very little to ensure accountability and oversight of the Executive branch of government. As a result, the Executive was able to establish what has been called a culture of authority. The advent of the Constitution, which entrenches the rule of law, a separation of powers doctrine, and the principle of legality, seeks to do away with the culture of authority and entrench a culture of 'justification'. However, to the extent that the Constitution includes clear accountability and oversight prescripts, to which all branches of government are bound, it envisages more than the idea of 'justification'. In this sense, at least, the Constitution seeks to ensure a 'culture of accountability' and oversight that ensures that certain checks and balances are in place between the different branches of government. Corruption and, specifically state capture phenomenon, are not exempt from these constitutional prescripts. This research suggests that corruption must be understood against the constitutional framework and in particular against the requirements of accountability and oversight.

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Department of Public Law

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Davids, Kirsten

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Calland, Richard

• public law

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/40859

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/40859