Is a picture really worth a thousand words? : some philosophical reflections on perceptual content
type: CreativeWork
description: The challenge presented by this paper is twofold; the first is to show that theories of perception ride a seesaw which is unsatisfactory, the second is to present a way to dismount the seesaw that these theories ride. The proposed dismount is suggested in the form of nonconceptual content of perceptual experiential states. In part A of the paper the seesaw metaphor is set up by showing that theories of perception concern themselves mainly with two questions. One of these questions is the epistemic question, which inquiries into the justificatory role played by perceptual experiential states. Such inquires conclude that the content of perceptual experiential states is conceptual. The other question is the descriptive question, which inquiries into the nature of perceptual experiential states. Such inquires conclude that the perceptual experiential states are not conceptual. The seesaw effect comes to play because theories of perception deal with the epistemic and the descriptive questions in isolation of each other. Part B of the paper shows how the theories of perception ride the seesaw. On the one side of the seesaw there are theories of perception that claim that perceptual experiential states are contentless. Bertrand Russell's account of sense-data is used to illustrate such theories. It is shown that while these theories are phenomenologically plausible, they are incapable of accounting for the justificatory role perceptual experiential states need to play. On the other side of the seesaw there are theories of perception that claim that perceptual experiential states have content. The account of conceptualism by John McDowell is used to illustrate the position of such theories. These theories are inadequate in accounting for the phenomenological aspect of perceptual experiential states while they are able to account for the epistemological role played by perceptual states. This is what I call riding the seesaw. Riding the seesaw does not allow any room for prog…
abstract: The challenge presented by this paper is twofold; the first is to show that theories of perception ride a seesaw which is unsatisfactory, the second is to present a way to dismount the seesaw that these theories ride. The proposed dismount is suggested in the form of nonconceptual content of perceptual experiential states. In part A of the paper the seesaw metaphor is set up by showing that theories of perception concern themselves mainly with two questions. One of these questions is the epistemic question, which inquiries into the justificatory role played by perceptual experiential states. Such inquires conclude that the content of perceptual experiential states is conceptual. The other question is the descriptive question, which inquiries into the nature of perceptual experiential states. Such inquires conclude that the perceptual experiential states are not conceptual. The seesaw effect comes to play because theories of perception deal with the epistemic and the descriptive questions in isolation of each other. Part B of the paper shows how the theories of perception ride the seesaw. On the one side of the seesaw there are theories of perception that claim that perceptual experiential states are contentless. Bertrand Russell's account of sense-data is used to illustrate such theories. It is shown that while these theories are phenomenologically plausible, they are incapable of accounting for the justificatory role perceptual experiential states need to play. On the other side of the seesaw there are theories of perception that claim that perceptual experiential states have content. The account of conceptualism by John McDowell is used to illustrate the position of such theories. These theories are inadequate in accounting for the phenomenological aspect of perceptual experiential states while they are able to account for the epistemological role played by perceptual states. This is what I call riding the seesaw. Riding the seesaw does not allow any room for prog…
author: Saliba, Ruth R
keywords: Philosophy
date published: 2002
date modified: 2026-07-22T22:23:06Z
provider: University of Cape Town
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: Department of Philosophy

PropertyValue
property ID: Handle
value: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/38373