The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others

In this paper, I aim to explore the problem of easy knowledge, outlined by Stewart Cohen (2002). I will examine the solutions given by Cohen (2002, 2005), Markie (2005), Black (2008),Klein (2004) and Becker (2013), and outline the problems that each faces. These problems, I will argue, constitute sufficient grounds to reject each of these theories as they stand. Following this, I will argue that we can adjust Becker’s (2013) theory such that it is able not only to adequately avoid the problem of easy knowledge, but also to give us a reasonable account of when and how we know and do not know propositions about the world. The central adjustment that I will make to Becker’s theory is to adopt a kind of epistemic contextualism. In particular, I will be drawing heavily on Jonathan Ichikawa’s (2011) essay on closure and contextualism in modal theories of epistemology. The consequences of adopting this perspective are that in heavyweight philosophical contexts, we turn out to know nothing at all - however, in ordinary everyday contexts, we can justifiably claim knowledge about the kinds of propositions we think we ought to be able to claim knowledge about. This consequence is pleasing to me, as it gives skeptical hypotheses their due - it treats them with the seriousness that they deserve, and admits that they are (often) unsolvable - while still preserving our intuitive belief that we can know many things about the external world.

Grantor

Department of Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2019

Author dc:creator

• White, Matthew Neil

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Chapman, Dean

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/30516

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/30516