"Concept" and "Context": Toward modelling understanding in Physics Education research

"Context sensitivity" is a core issue in physics education research (PER). Why does student understanding of a concept depend so crucially on the context in which it is embedded? This dissertation attempts to answer this question by using a variety of theoretical tools to model understanding. We conducted three empirical studies which probed context sensitivity of student understanding of (i) Vector Addition; (ii) The FCI (Force Concept Inventory); and (iii) the learning of the concept of a Mathematical Group. (i) Regarding vector addition, we discovered context sensitivities involving the type of physical quantity added (e.g. force or momentum); the textual prompts "total", "net" and "resultant"; and the object on which a force acts. (ii) In the FCI, we discovered a moderate context sensitivity to unfamiliar words (i.e. when familiar words like "box" were substituted for unfamiliar words like "kist".) This sensitivity was moderately correlated with the difficulty of the question. (iii) Previous studies have shown that learners exhibit a sensitivity to the concreteness of the learning condition of a Mathematical Group; our study shows that students are engaged in different types of activity in these conditions. A variety of theoretical tools from PER, Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Psychology and other areas of Education Research are used to model student understanding in these various studies. Three key insights emerged. (a) The importance of one's model of "concept" - how it relates to the notion of "context", and how one chooses an appropriate grain size. (b) The difference between "expert" and "novice" - how this difference influences one's model of "concept", and how it influences one's notion of "sameness" and "difference". (c) Student reasoning - how a framing of a situation might result in fast, associative, linguistic reasoning on the one hand, or slow, deliberate simulative reasoning on the other. Finally, this thesis is grounded in Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophy which maintains that notions of "concept", "context" and "understanding" obtain meaning not be referring to some transcendental "thing", but by being embedded in our messy form of life. In other words, by modelling understanding we are not approaching the "true meaning" of the term. Instead we are demonstrating how our various models are constitutive of what we mean when we say: "My students understand this concept".

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Department of Physics

Year dc:date.issued

2018

Author dc:creator

• Southey, Philip

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Allie, Saalih

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/27857

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/27857