The concept of autonomy

The question of which of our actions or desires are genuinely attributable to us is the question I examine in this thesis. I use the term "autonomous" to describe those agents whose desires or actions are genuinely their own, and I refer to actions or desires which cannot genuinely be attributed to agents as heteronomous actions or desires. I have chosen to discuss this question under the rubric of the concept of autonomy, although the number of near-synonyms in the philosophical literature means that I could, perhaps, have referred instead in my title to concepts such as freedom, responsibility, independence, authenticity, self-determination, self-identity, freedom of the will and similar concepts. But whatever terminological choice is made, the issue that interests me concerns the nature of those actions or desires which are genuinely the agent's - those desires and actions which, as some have put it, are the agent's rear desires and actions.

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Department of Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

1996

Author dc:creator

• Jennings, Ian Douglas

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13416

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/13416