Sentimental damages in English contract law : a critical analysis

This dissertation's primary hypothesis is that the angst-spawning confusion plaguing this area of law stems from a feckless amalgamation of parallel, if not competing, notions of loss. Let me explain. When a promisee seeks judicial relief for breach, the court habitually applies two deeply-ingrained presumptions of fact whose status has been unconsciously elevated to rules of law.10 These judicial presumptions are that: 1. The promisee's concern is loss of performance and not loss of promise; and (After confining the matter to loss of performance) 2. The promisee's performance interest is essentially pecuniary value (profit) and not non-pecuniary value (utility). The Addis case illustrates the sad result of focusing on performance in a situation where the predominant loss caused by breach is promissory in character (Presumption 1). Farley, on the other hand, promotes the commercial agenda by perpetuating the notion that financial loss is the premier interest of contract as law (Presumption 2). This dissertation tests the above hypothesis by evaluating the prohibition on mental distress damages.

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Department of Private Law

Year dc:date.issued

2012

Author dc:creator

• Emurwon, Brian Kwame

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Hutchinson, Dale

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/12609

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/12609