{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/398819"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/398819","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"A Crisis Without Replication: Replication, the Current Crisis in Psychology, and Open Science Investigated Using Insights From Metascience","abstract":"Psychology and related fields have been gripped by the replication crisis since at least 2011. In response to this problem, a new field of empirical metascience has emerged, focusing on finding causes and solutions. This development opens a mutually beneficial pathway: philosophy of science can be informed by metascientific results, and metascience can take rigorous insights from philosophy of science as a theoretical basis. Throughout this dissertation, I draw specifically on metascientific evidence as a methodological choice to inform conceptual analyses of key concepts surrounding the replication crisis. In the first chapter, I introduce the replication crisis and the motivation for this dissertation. In the second chapter, I consider the concept of replication and possible accounts of it, argue that the concept is redundant and propose a deflationary account instead. In chapters three to five, I examine the aetiology of the crisis. Chapter three reframes the replication crisis as a crisis of inference, which I show is a better explanation of our surprise at replication failures. This account also enables an integration of the plethora of proposed crises under the umbrella of ill-adjusted inference. The fourth chapter explores the green thumb explanation of individual replication failures and finds it at best unconvincing or even deeply worrying for psychology as a field of research. Chapter five considers the concept of questionable research practices (QRPs), arguing for the elimination of the label. Instead of focusing on QRPs, I argue that we should question research practice and understand instances of practices currently described as QRPs on a context-dependent spectrum from good to bad. Finally, in chapter six I examine the main proposed solutions: open science practices. I explain that these practices can help solve the crisis if we assume a hostile epistemic environment at the core of the problem, but not if we assume widespread epistemic vice. A combination of more appropriate inferences, clearer conceptual thinking, and better as well as more open research practices may help psychology leave its crisis behind while securing its future.","abstract_html":"Psychology and related fields have been gripped by the replication crisis since at least 2011. In response to this problem, a new field of empirical metascience has emerged, focusing on finding causes and solutions. This development opens a mutually beneficial pathway: philosophy of science can be informed by metascientific results, and metascience can take rigorous insights from philosophy of science as a theoretical basis. Throughout this dissertation, I draw specifically on metascientific evidence as a methodological choice to inform conceptual analyses of key concepts surrounding the replication crisis. In the first chapter, I introduce the replication crisis and the motivation for this dissertation. In the second chapter, I consider the concept of replication and possible accounts of it, argue that the concept is redundant and propose a deflationary account instead. In chapters three to five, I examine the aetiology of the crisis. Chapter three reframes the replication crisis as a crisis of inference, which I show is a better explanation of our surprise at replication failures. This account also enables an integration of the plethora of proposed crises under the umbrella of ill-adjusted inference. The fourth chapter explores the green thumb explanation of individual replication failures and finds it at best unconvincing or even deeply worrying for psychology as a field of research. Chapter five considers the concept of questionable research practices (QRPs), arguing for the elimination of the label. Instead of focusing on QRPs, I argue that we should question research practice and understand instances of practices currently described as QRPs on a context-dependent spectrum from good to bad. Finally, in chapter six I examine the main proposed solutions: open science practices. I explain that these practices can help solve the crisis if we assume a hostile epistemic environment at the core of the problem, but not if we assume widespread epistemic vice. A combination of more appropriate inferences, clearer conceptual thinking, and better as well as more open research practices may help psychology leave its crisis behind while securing its future.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Crüwell, Sophia"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Stegenga, Jacob","Halina, Marta","Bird, Alexander"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-07-31","date_published":"2025-07-31","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:13Z","subjects":["Replication Crisis","Replication","Psychology","Open Science","Philosophy of Science","Metascience","Inference","Questionable Research Practices"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/158a78fe-cd7f-4e6d-87af-2aed3665e9ef/download","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000341785820"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0003-4178-5820","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4178-5820","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.127572","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Stegenga, Jacob","Halina, Marta","Bird, Alexander"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["Cusanuswerk"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Crüwell, Sophia"]},{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000341785820"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025-07-31"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/398819"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Replication Crisis","Replication","Psychology","Open Science","Philosophy of Science","Metascience","Inference","Questionable Research Practices"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/158a78fe-cd7f-4e6d-87af-2aed3665e9ef/download","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargodate","label":"Dc Rights Embargodate","values":["2027-02-24"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargotype","label":"Dc Rights Embargotype","values":["embargo"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.127572"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/4fafb537-facd-4718-9b5d-14477549d21e/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Psychology and related fields have been gripped by the replication crisis since at least 2011. 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Chapter three reframes the replication crisis as a crisis of inference, which I show is a better explanation of our surprise at replication failures. This account also enables an integration of the plethora of proposed crises under the umbrella of ill-adjusted inference. The fourth chapter explores the green thumb explanation of individual replication failures and finds it at best unconvincing or even deeply worrying for psychology as a field of research. Chapter five considers the concept of questionable research practices (QRPs), arguing for the elimination of the label. Instead of focusing on QRPs, I argue that we should question research practice and understand instances of practices currently described as QRPs on a context-dependent spectrum from good to bad. Finally, in chapter six I examine the main proposed solutions: open science practices. I explain that these practices can help solve the crisis if we assume a hostile epistemic environment at the core of the problem, but not if we assume widespread epistemic vice. 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Chapter three reframes the replication crisis as a crisis of inference, which I show is a better explanation of our surprise at replication failures. This account also enables an integration of the plethora of proposed crises under the umbrella of ill-adjusted inference. The fourth chapter explores the green thumb explanation of individual replication failures and finds it at best unconvincing or even deeply worrying for psychology as a field of research. Chapter five considers the concept of questionable research practices (QRPs), arguing for the elimination of the label. Instead of focusing on QRPs, I argue that we should question research practice and understand instances of practices currently described as QRPs on a context-dependent spectrum from good to bad. Finally, in chapter six I examine the main proposed solutions: open science practices. 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