Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī on Mental Existence: Theoretical Explorations and Philosophical Implications

Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (1730-1791) is an 18th-century erudite Ottoman scholar most prominently known for his paradigmatic intervention in the fields of logic and metaphysics. Based on textual evidence dispersed throughout his corpus, the present dissertation seeks to both systematically and comprehensively construct his position on the theory of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī). The investigation is structured in two main parts: Part One addresses this theory as an independent theoretical subject, while Part Two examines it as a framework for analysing two secondary onto-epistemological issues that arise from it. Further, Part One consists of four main chapters: Chapter One establishes foundational terms, exploring the key onto-epistemological distinctions between mind-exterior, mental-external existence, and shadow-real existence. Chapter Two addresses two further foundational topics: the Avicennan background of the theory of mental existence and the epistemological necessity of the presence of a sciential form in knowledge. This chapter reveals that the theory of mental existence in its broader sense, encompassing the strong and weak versions of the theory, in Gelenbevī’s view, is self-evidently necessary. Chapter Three then examines Gelenbevī’s engagement with the strong version of mental existence (the mainstream verified position), wherein we demonstrate that Gelenbevī’s position on the mental existence of things—excluding the mental existence of perspectival notions (al-umūr al-iʿtibāriyyah) and impossibles (mumtaniʿāt)—reveals two distinct levels: identity-based (ittiḥād) and the correspondence-based (muṭābaqah) models, and their respective relations with two different modes of knowledge, i.e. presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) and occurrential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuṣūlī). Chapter Four assesses Gelenbevī’s formulation of the weak version of mental existence, an exemplar (shabaḥ) theory, and its epistemic sufficiency for unveiling the known object based on a “specific”, “complete”, and “perfect” relation between the two. This chapter also clarifies Gelenbevī’s deflationary stance regarding the strong and weak versions of the theory. Building on this, Part Two consists of two chapters and explores the broader philosophical implications of the theory of mental existence. Chapter Five investigates the inadequacy of mental existence for justifying the existence of perspectival notions in nafs al-amr, offering a solution based on the concept of “external estimative existence” (wujūd mawhūm khārijī). Finally, Chapter Six examines Gelenbevī’s position on the eternal knowledge of God and its relation to the theory of mental existence. These two chapters attempt to resolve these problems without resorting to mental existence in the conventional sense. Throughout these chapters, this dissertation seeks to methodically develop a comprehensive hermeneutical interpretation of Gelenbevī’s theory of mental existence.

Name dc:type.qualificationname

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

University of Cambridge

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Besikci, MEHMET NECMEDDIN

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Street, Tony

• Epistemology
• Islamic Philosophy
• Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī
• Knowledge
• Mental existence
• Ottoman Philosophy
• Wujūd dhihnī

Licence

• https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/cb6f17d3-4c5f-4cb0-a4e4-b5718dd7f76b/download
• http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved

Language dc:language

eng

DOI dc:identifier.doi

https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.124155

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/394066