An Alternative Theory of Cause and Effect: Nature's Mutual and Synchronous Relationship

In science, causality (or causation) is essential when formulating theories or making predictions about the external world. The theories of causation that continue to dominate philosophy and science today assume David Hume’s view that causes and effects, if they exist, would follow each other in a one-directional succession: each cause precedes and affects its effect without being affected in return. In this thesis, I argue that the neglected Scottish philosopher Lady Mary Shepherd (1777–1847) developed a novel, synchronous and reciprocal theory of causation that offers an alternative to the idea that causation goes with time’s arrow. Furthermore, I argue that Shepherd was an important member of William Whewell’s intellectual circle and that her views may have influenced the more famous theories of causation propounded by Whewell (1847) and his close friend John Herschel (1841). I use letters from a previously unknown correspondence between Shepherd and Whewell, discovered in the Trinity College library during my research, to support my argument. Over the course of four chapters, I develop a novel interpretation and formal reconstruction of Shepherd’s view primarily as it relates to physics presented as an alternative way of seeing causality to Hume’s. I also recreate arguments that Shepherd could have given in support of her alternative theory of causation. The first chapter situates Shepherd’s work in the historical context of early nineteenth-century physics. In the second chapter, I interpret Shepherd’s view that cause and effect are not sequential but rather synchronous and discuss some of its significant implications for how we understand the passage of time. Building on this, I show in the third chapter that in Shepherd’s view cause and effect are mutual and they are but two different ways of looking at the same phenomenon. Lastly, in the fourth chapter, I show how the idea of reciprocity in Shepherd’s view of causation that I emphasise in this thesis helps us better to understand her theory of perception. I argue that from Shepherd’s view of causation it can be taken to follow that just as we are being affected by objects and qualities in the external world when observing them, so too are we affecting them in return. I argue that Shepherd’s view of perception yields a novel view of what we can know about the external world which I call humble realism.

Name dc:type.qualificationname

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

University of Cambridge

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Lindblom, Sandra

Advisors dc:contributor.advisor

• Dewar, Neil
• Borcherding, Julia

• philosophy of causation
• history and philosophy of physics
• philosophy of Mary Shepherd
• philosophy of David Hume
• metaphysics of perception

Licence

• https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/28b8b0ec-990d-4df4-bcf2-f6727e4c6983/download
• http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved

DOI dc:identifier.doi

https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.120142

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/387294