Self-deception and Responsibility
type: CreativeWork
description: This thesis analyses the phenomenon of self-deception and explores the assessment of its consequences in moral responsibility and criminal culpability. It consists of three parts. Part I focuses on the phenomenon of self-deception and proposes a new model of the mind of the self-deceiver based on recent research in cognitive psychology. The central argument is that self-deception involves the person unconsciously reasoning in a biased way about new data conflicting with a resistant first belief about the self. This leads to the formation of the self-deceived false belief. Part II of the thesis looks at the moral responsibility of self-deceivers for harmful actions based on their self-deceived false beliefs. The central argument is that individuals can be held morally responsible for harms based on ignorance (including self-deceived false beliefs), even though their ignorance results from unconscious processes, if they are in a position of power relative to their victim in their situation and fail to meet the responsibility created by their position of power. Part III of the thesis explores culpability for inadvertent negligence in criminal law (including cases of self-deception). The central argument is that inadvertently negligent agents (including the self-deceiver) should be held criminally culpable when they are in a position of power relative to their victim in their situation and fail to meet the responsibility created by their position of power.
abstract: This thesis analyses the phenomenon of self-deception and explores the assessment of its consequences in moral responsibility and criminal culpability. It consists of three parts. Part I focuses on the phenomenon of self-deception and proposes a new model of the mind of the self-deceiver based on recent research in cognitive psychology. The central argument is that self-deception involves the person unconsciously reasoning in a biased way about new data conflicting with a resistant first belief about the self. This leads to the formation of the self-deceived false belief. Part II of the thesis looks at the moral responsibility of self-deceivers for harmful actions based on their self-deceived false beliefs. The central argument is that individuals can be held morally responsible for harms based on ignorance (including self-deceived false beliefs), even though their ignorance results from unconscious processes, if they are in a position of power relative to their victim in their situation and fail to meet the responsibility created by their position of power. Part III of the thesis explores culpability for inadvertent negligence in criminal law (including cases of self-deception). The central argument is that inadvertently negligent agents (including the self-deceiver) should be held criminally culpable when they are in a position of power relative to their victim in their situation and fail to meet the responsibility created by their position of power.
author: Arn, Jeanne-Rose
keywords: blame, capacitarian views, cognitive bias, cognitive processes, conduct views, criminal culpability, criminal law, culpability, deflationary theories, dual-process models, expectations, externalism, false beliefs, ignorance, inadvertent negligence, intentionalist theories, intentions, mistakes, moral philosophy, moral psychology, moral responsibility, negligence, philosophy of mind, power relationships, quality of will views, responsibility, self-deception, self-knowledge, Strawson P.F., tracing views, unconscious
license: https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/aba23dc3-16f9-4911-9c07-03ad1b32d52a/download
license: http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved
date published: 2024-12-06
date modified: 2026-07-22T22:24:28Z
provider: Cambridge University
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: University of Cambridge

PropertyValue
property ID: DOI
value: 10.17863/CAM.119886