Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Contests and Matching

This thesis contains three chapters on contests and matching. The first two chapters explore the role of target prizes in contests with sabotage. The third chapter studies the optimal college admissions mechanism where students are horizontally and vertically differentiated.

Name dc:type.qualificationname

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

University of Cambridge

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Chung, Adrian

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Harris, Christopher

• admissions lottery
• Boston mechanism
• college admissions
• deferred acceptance
• endogenous prize
• optimal mechanism
• sabotage
• Tullock contest

Licence

• https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/b7666593-e79a-4cf3-b0ae-e60cd5ea1039/download
• http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved

DOI dc:identifier.doi

https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.119853

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/386815