University of Cambridge
Action, Motive, and Self-Knowledge—An Inquiry into the Uncertain Agent
Abstract
dc:description.abstractIt is often of moral and political significance that we know why we act. Realizing that one acts out of love, for instance, has the potential to radically alter one’s course of life. Similarly, understanding how one’s own actions are permeated by social norms can be an important step towards addressing the ways in which we contribute to existing patterns of injustice. If those realizations are important, so is the process of getting there. When we come to know our motives, we move from a state of ignorance or uncertainty to a state of self-knowledge. This process is what I call ‘self-inquiry’. Yet, many philosophers subscribe to a model of self-knowledge which gives no substantial role to such self-inquiry into our motives. Either our wills are portrayed as transparent, or intractable. On the one hand, it is a widespread assumption from Descartes to Anscombe that we stand in a special relation to the reasons behind our actions which precludes uncertainty. On the other hand, contemporary empirical approaches often follow Nietzsche in adopting a sceptical outlook and portray the mind as so complex that self-knowledge of motives becomes impossible. In both traditions, there is no real work left for self-inquiry to do; either we already know our motives, or we can’t know them at all. Finding my way between these two extremes, I develop a theory of self-knowledge of motives which leaves room for substantial self-inquiry. Conversely, this has implications for how we think of the metaphysics of agency. A widespread picture has it that only reasons we can rationally endorse and therefore know form part of our true selves as agents. On my view, we ought to decouple practical rationality from conscious awareness. This makes room for the possibility to act on reasons we don’t know about, and therefore carves out space for morally relevant inquiries into our motives. However, I also go on to suggest that there is a limit to rational self-inquiry, and inquiries in general. As important as it is to inquire into ourselves, it is equally crucial to know the limits of self-inquiry so as not to fall into overthinking. Applied to motives that means that even though it often matters to know our motives, we have to recognize when we are in a situation where the only rational option is to embrace uncertainty about why we act.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- Doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Cambridge
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2024
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Hubacher, Pablo
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Holton, Richard
- Munton, Jessie
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
dc:rightsIdentifiers
dc:identifier.*- DOI dc:identifier.doi
- https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.116271
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/380786