Epistemic Utility

This thesis is comprised of three papers each about a separate topic in Epistemic Utility Theory (EUT). The first paper (§2) distinguishes objectivist and subjectivist conceptions of epistemic utility. It argues in favour of the latter conception on the grounds that only when epistemic utility is conceived of in this way is there a convincing argument that measures of epistemic utility must be strictly proper. The strict propriety of epistemic utility functions is essential to the explanatory project of EUT. Thus, only a subjectivist conception of epistemic utility will suffice for the explanatory purposes of EUT. The second paper (§3) suggests that Pettigrew’s (2016a) argument for the claim that the divergences which generate measures of epistemic utility are symmetric is unsound. It shows that an analogous argument can be given for the view that these divergences satisfy the triangle inequality. As such, the argument that these divergences are symmetric and the argument that they satisfy the triangle inequality stand or fall together. But the triangle inequality is inconsistent with Pettigrew’s other constraints. Thus, the Pettigrew cannot endorse symmetry on the basis of this argument. Finally, the third paper (§4) argues that epistemic rationality cannot be explained in terms of the pursuit or promotion of a distinctively epistemic kind of value. The argument is a dilemma structured around Berker’s (2013a) claim that propositions are separate. If they are, then EUT is open to counterexamples of the kind Berker describes. By contrast, if propositions are not separate, then there is no way to motivate the exceptionalism to which EUT is committed. Either way, EUT fails as a theory of epistemic rationality.

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

University of Cambridge

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Woodcock, Aiden

Advisors dc:contributor.advisor

• Dandelet, Sophia
• Ahmed, Arif
• Holton, Richard

• Philosophy
• Epistemology
• Epistemic Utility Theory
• Epistemic Decision Theory
• Epistemic Value

Licence

• https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/bfa220de-4a79-48b0-b743-cd1cf0dbfb5e/download
• http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved

Language dc:language

eng

DOI dc:identifier.doi

https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.114925

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/378609