{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/372481"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/372481","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Self-knowledge in Alcibiades I","abstract":"This dissertation explores the topic of self-knowledge as it is presented in *Alcibiades I*. Although self-knowledge is widely recognised as the unifying topic of the dialogue, it has proved difficult to derive one unified conception of self-knowledge from it. I argue that this is partly because the dialogue treats of three different conceptions of self-knowledge, without, however, making the shifts between them explicit. The first conception of self-knowledge, is the traditional Greek notion of knowing one’s limits and knowing one’s place. Socrates recasts this, through a lengthy exposition of Alcibiades’ ignorance, as knowing the limits of one’s knowledge, stressing that these limits also determine the bounds within which one should act. A second conception of self-knowledge underlies the *Alcibiades*’ discussion of statesmanship and the statesman’s need for self-knowledge. I argue that the self-knowledge required of the statesman is a craft-like knowledge of what a human being is. In so far as it also includes knowing what a *good* human being is, this kind of self-knowledge turns out to be substantial, covering knowledge of justice and virtue as well. However, neither of these conceptions of self-knowledge make sense of self-knowledge as it is presented in the analogy drawn towards the end of the dialogue, between a self-seeing eye and a self-knowing soul. Here self-knowledge emerges both as an ideal to strive towards and as knowledge of the particular knower herself. I argue that we should understand the eye analogy as illustrating the *Alcibiades*’ core conception of self-knowledge, namely self-knowledge as mirroring. I further argue that although dialogue provides the paradigm case of self-mirroring, the soul can in fact mirror itself in the whole sphere of its practical life. Moreover, the two earlier conceptions of self-knowledge serve as necessary conditions for knowing oneself most fully (*malista*), i.e. knowing oneself as someone whose practical life is in full accordance with wisdom.","abstract_html":"This dissertation explores the topic of self-knowledge as it is presented in *Alcibiades I*. Although self-knowledge is widely recognised as the unifying topic of the dialogue, it has proved difficult to derive one unified conception of self-knowledge from it. I argue that this is partly because the dialogue treats of three different conceptions of self-knowledge, without, however, making the shifts between them explicit. The first conception of self-knowledge, is the traditional Greek notion of knowing one’s limits and knowing one’s place. Socrates recasts this, through a lengthy exposition of Alcibiades’ ignorance, as knowing the limits of one’s knowledge, stressing that these limits also determine the bounds within which one should act. A second conception of self-knowledge underlies the *Alcibiades*’ discussion of statesmanship and the statesman’s need for self-knowledge. I argue that the self-knowledge required of the statesman is a craft-like knowledge of what a human being is. In so far as it also includes knowing what a *good* human being is, this kind of self-knowledge turns out to be substantial, covering knowledge of justice and virtue as well. However, neither of these conceptions of self-knowledge make sense of self-knowledge as it is presented in the analogy drawn towards the end of the dialogue, between a self-seeing eye and a self-knowing soul. Here self-knowledge emerges both as an ideal to strive towards and as knowledge of the particular knower herself. I argue that we should understand the eye analogy as illustrating the *Alcibiades*’ core conception of self-knowledge, namely self-knowledge as mirroring. I further argue that although dialogue provides the paradigm case of self-mirroring, the soul can in fact mirror itself in the whole sphere of its practical life. Moreover, the two earlier conceptions of self-knowledge serve as necessary conditions for knowing oneself most fully (*malista*), i.e. knowing oneself as someone whose practical life is in full accordance with wisdom.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Wasmuth, Ellisif"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Warren, James"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-08-15","date_published":"2016-08-15","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:30Z","subjects":["self-knowledge","Delphic inscription","Plato","Socrates","Alcibiades","Alcibiades I"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/f20f6b0e-5b1e-4868-8d3d-e4318843920c/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.111347","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Warren, James"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Wasmuth, Ellisif"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2016-08-15"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/372481"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["self-knowledge","Delphic inscription","Plato","Socrates","Alcibiades","Alcibiades I"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/f20f6b0e-5b1e-4868-8d3d-e4318843920c/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.111347"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/7e0aa345-a5f2-4d02-8b32-a61590942ee7/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation explores the topic of self-knowledge as it is presented in *Alcibiades I*. 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In so far as it also includes knowing what a *good* human being is, this kind of self-knowledge turns out to be substantial, covering knowledge of justice and virtue as well. However, neither of these conceptions of self-knowledge make sense of self-knowledge as it is presented in the analogy drawn towards the end of the dialogue, between a self-seeing eye and a self-knowing soul. Here self-knowledge emerges both as an ideal to strive towards and as knowledge of the particular knower herself. I argue that we should understand the eye analogy as illustrating the *Alcibiades*’ core conception of self-knowledge, namely self-knowledge as mirroring. I further argue that although dialogue provides the paradigm case of self-mirroring, the soul can in fact mirror itself in the whole sphere of its practical life. 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