{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/370051"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/370051","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Nationalism or Cost-Benefit Analysis in Perception: The Logic of China’s Foreign Policy Choices in Bilateral Disputes in Post-Cold War Period","abstract":"This research discusses the changes in the degree of toughness of China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral international disputes over the period from 1992 to 2022. This research first reviews previous explanations of why the Chinese government adopts tough foreign policies in international disputes in academia. In response to the popular view that underline the influence of nationalism, this research analyses contemporary Chinese nationalism and its impact on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Contemporary Chinese nationalism can be divided into two types: official nationalism and popular nationalism. Official nationalism demands unconditional loyalty of its adherents to the Chinese government and does not exert pressure on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Popular nationalism, due to its considerable social mobilization capacity, may have the potential to influence the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices through a bottom-up approach, especially in the context of the Chinese government’s increasing reliance on nationalism for its regime legitimacy. By examining the changes in the Chinese government’s economic performance and the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism, this research finds that the Chinese government faced two primary scenarios between 1992 and 2022. In the first scenario, roughly between 1992 and 2012, the Chinese government was able to maintain good economic performance while popular nationalism had a strong capacity for social mobilization. In this scenario, the Chinese government did not need to resort to nationalism as an important source of regime legitimacy, and the pressure exerted by popular nationalists was not sufficient to undermine the legitimacy base of the Chinese government. In the second scenario, roughly between 2013 and 2022, the Chinese government was only able to maintain limited economic performance while the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism was significantly reduced. In this scenario, the Chinese government strengthened its control over popular nationalism, rendering it no longer able to pressure the Chinese government’s decision-making through social movements. Moreover, the regime legitimacy of the Chinese government was not overly dependent on nationalism, and the Chinese government was still able to afford the policy costs of adopting a foreign policy that does not meet the demands of popular nationalism. Therefore, within the timeframe covered by this research, the influence of nationalism is not sufficient to explain the toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. This research assumes that the Chinese government is a rational actor during the timeframe covered by this research, and its foreign policy decisions in disputes are rational and consistent. This assumption is valid in all cases examined in this research, as China’s top leaders were structurally constrained by the collective leadership system and there had been no instances in which the majority of China’s political elites identified with irrational and antagonistic nationalist sentiments. This research establishes an analytical framework for China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral disputes based on this assumption. This analytical framework includes three independent variables and one dependent variable. The dependent variable is the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. And the independent variables include the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of the particular bilateral relations, its perception of the priority of the various interests involved in the dispute, and its perception of the severity of the dispute. This research applies this analytical framework to the analysis of eight disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issues and historical issues, fourteen disputes between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue, economic and trade issues, and the issues of United States Armed Forces infringing China’s sovereignty, and six disputes between China and South Korea over the security issue, the fishing issue, and the historical issues. Through the analysis of these 28 bilateral international disputes, this research finds that, holding other variables constant, the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of a given set of bilateral relations is negatively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes, while the Chinese government’s perception of the priority of the interests involved in the dispute and its perception of the severity of the dispute are positively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes.","abstract_html":"This research discusses the changes in the degree of toughness of China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral international disputes over the period from 1992 to 2022. This research first reviews previous explanations of why the Chinese government adopts tough foreign policies in international disputes in academia. In response to the popular view that underline the influence of nationalism, this research analyses contemporary Chinese nationalism and its impact on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Contemporary Chinese nationalism can be divided into two types: official nationalism and popular nationalism. Official nationalism demands unconditional loyalty of its adherents to the Chinese government and does not exert pressure on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Popular nationalism, due to its considerable social mobilization capacity, may have the potential to influence the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices through a bottom-up approach, especially in the context of the Chinese government’s increasing reliance on nationalism for its regime legitimacy. By examining the changes in the Chinese government’s economic performance and the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism, this research finds that the Chinese government faced two primary scenarios between 1992 and 2022. In the first scenario, roughly between 1992 and 2012, the Chinese government was able to maintain good economic performance while popular nationalism had a strong capacity for social mobilization. In this scenario, the Chinese government did not need to resort to nationalism as an important source of regime legitimacy, and the pressure exerted by popular nationalists was not sufficient to undermine the legitimacy base of the Chinese government. In the second scenario, roughly between 2013 and 2022, the Chinese government was only able to maintain limited economic performance while the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism was significantly reduced. In this scenario, the Chinese government strengthened its control over popular nationalism, rendering it no longer able to pressure the Chinese government’s decision-making through social movements. Moreover, the regime legitimacy of the Chinese government was not overly dependent on nationalism, and the Chinese government was still able to afford the policy costs of adopting a foreign policy that does not meet the demands of popular nationalism. Therefore, within the timeframe covered by this research, the influence of nationalism is not sufficient to explain the toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. This research assumes that the Chinese government is a rational actor during the timeframe covered by this research, and its foreign policy decisions in disputes are rational and consistent. This assumption is valid in all cases examined in this research, as China’s top leaders were structurally constrained by the collective leadership system and there had been no instances in which the majority of China’s political elites identified with irrational and antagonistic nationalist sentiments. This research establishes an analytical framework for China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral disputes based on this assumption. This analytical framework includes three independent variables and one dependent variable. The dependent variable is the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. And the independent variables include the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of the particular bilateral relations, its perception of the priority of the various interests involved in the dispute, and its perception of the severity of the dispute. This research applies this analytical framework to the analysis of eight disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issues and historical issues, fourteen disputes between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue, economic and trade issues, and the issues of United States Armed Forces infringing China’s sovereignty, and six disputes between China and South Korea over the security issue, the fishing issue, and the historical issues. Through the analysis of these 28 bilateral international disputes, this research finds that, holding other variables constant, the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of a given set of bilateral relations is negatively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes, while the Chinese government’s perception of the priority of the interests involved in the dispute and its perception of the severity of the dispute are positively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Xu, Weijun"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Nilsson-Wright, John"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-03-19","date_published":"2024-03-19","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:03Z","subjects":["China","foreign policy","nationalism","perception","Sino-Japanese relations","Sino-South Korean relations","Sino-U.S. relations"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5b4df223-804f-4927-80aa-3bfaba5a0029/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000241625440"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0002-4162-5440","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4162-5440","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.109635","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Nilsson-Wright, John"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Xu, Weijun"]},{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000241625440"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2024-03-19"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/370051"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["China","foreign policy","nationalism","perception","Sino-Japanese relations","Sino-South Korean relations","Sino-U.S. relations"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5b4df223-804f-4927-80aa-3bfaba5a0029/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargotype","label":"Dc Rights Embargotype","values":["controlled.access"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.109635"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/a312703e-7e67-4412-a260-b10a015b05aa/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This research discusses the changes in the degree of toughness of China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral international disputes over the period from 1992 to 2022. This research first reviews previous explanations of why the Chinese government adopts tough foreign policies in international disputes in academia. In response to the popular view that underline the influence of nationalism, this research analyses contemporary Chinese nationalism and its impact on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Contemporary Chinese nationalism can be divided into two types: official nationalism and popular nationalism. Official nationalism demands unconditional loyalty of its adherents to the Chinese government and does not exert pressure on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Popular nationalism, due to its considerable social mobilization capacity, may have the potential to influence the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices through a bottom-up approach, especially in the context of the Chinese government’s increasing reliance on nationalism for its regime legitimacy. By examining the changes in the Chinese government’s economic performance and the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism, this research finds that the Chinese government faced two primary scenarios between 1992 and 2022. In the first scenario, roughly between 1992 and 2012, the Chinese government was able to maintain good economic performance while popular nationalism had a strong capacity for social mobilization. In this scenario, the Chinese government did not need to resort to nationalism as an important source of regime legitimacy, and the pressure exerted by popular nationalists was not sufficient to undermine the legitimacy base of the Chinese government. In the second scenario, roughly between 2013 and 2022, the Chinese government was only able to maintain limited economic performance while the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism was significantly reduced. In this scenario, the Chinese government strengthened its control over popular nationalism, rendering it no longer able to pressure the Chinese government’s decision-making through social movements. Moreover, the regime legitimacy of the Chinese government was not overly dependent on nationalism, and the Chinese government was still able to afford the policy costs of adopting a foreign policy that does not meet the demands of popular nationalism. Therefore, within the timeframe covered by this research, the influence of nationalism is not sufficient to explain the toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. This research assumes that the Chinese government is a rational actor during the timeframe covered by this research, and its foreign policy decisions in disputes are rational and consistent. This assumption is valid in all cases examined in this research, as China’s top leaders were structurally constrained by the collective leadership system and there had been no instances in which the majority of China’s political elites identified with irrational and antagonistic nationalist sentiments. This research establishes an analytical framework for China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral disputes based on this assumption. This analytical framework includes three independent variables and one dependent variable. The dependent variable is the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. And the independent variables include the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of the particular bilateral relations, its perception of the priority of the various interests involved in the dispute, and its perception of the severity of the dispute. This research applies this analytical framework to the analysis of eight disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issues and historical issues, fourteen disputes between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue, economic and trade issues, and the issues of United States Armed Forces infringing China’s sovereignty, and six disputes between China and South Korea over the security issue, the fishing issue, and the historical issues. Through the analysis of these 28 bilateral international disputes, this research finds that, holding other variables constant, the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of a given set of bilateral relations is negatively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes, while the Chinese government’s perception of the priority of the interests involved in the dispute and its perception of the severity of the dispute are positively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["757015429ea851d72d9c5474de91ffc2","87eda9de84448d1f82354d60eee3eb5f"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Nationalism or Cost-Benefit Analysis in Perception: The Logic of China’s Foreign Policy Choices in Bilateral Disputes in Post-Cold War Period"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Nilsson-Wright, John"],"dc:creator":["Xu, Weijun"],"dc:creator.authoridentifier":["0000000241625440"],"dc:date.issued":["2024-03-19"],"dc:description.abstract":["This research discusses the changes in the degree of toughness of China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral international disputes over the period from 1992 to 2022. This research first reviews previous explanations of why the Chinese government adopts tough foreign policies in international disputes in academia. In response to the popular view that underline the influence of nationalism, this research analyses contemporary Chinese nationalism and its impact on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Contemporary Chinese nationalism can be divided into two types: official nationalism and popular nationalism. Official nationalism demands unconditional loyalty of its adherents to the Chinese government and does not exert pressure on the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices. Popular nationalism, due to its considerable social mobilization capacity, may have the potential to influence the Chinese government’s foreign policy choices through a bottom-up approach, especially in the context of the Chinese government’s increasing reliance on nationalism for its regime legitimacy. By examining the changes in the Chinese government’s economic performance and the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism, this research finds that the Chinese government faced two primary scenarios between 1992 and 2022. In the first scenario, roughly between 1992 and 2012, the Chinese government was able to maintain good economic performance while popular nationalism had a strong capacity for social mobilization. In this scenario, the Chinese government did not need to resort to nationalism as an important source of regime legitimacy, and the pressure exerted by popular nationalists was not sufficient to undermine the legitimacy base of the Chinese government. In the second scenario, roughly between 2013 and 2022, the Chinese government was only able to maintain limited economic performance while the social mobilization capacity of popular nationalism was significantly reduced. In this scenario, the Chinese government strengthened its control over popular nationalism, rendering it no longer able to pressure the Chinese government’s decision-making through social movements. Moreover, the regime legitimacy of the Chinese government was not overly dependent on nationalism, and the Chinese government was still able to afford the policy costs of adopting a foreign policy that does not meet the demands of popular nationalism. Therefore, within the timeframe covered by this research, the influence of nationalism is not sufficient to explain the toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. This research assumes that the Chinese government is a rational actor during the timeframe covered by this research, and its foreign policy decisions in disputes are rational and consistent. This assumption is valid in all cases examined in this research, as China’s top leaders were structurally constrained by the collective leadership system and there had been no instances in which the majority of China’s political elites identified with irrational and antagonistic nationalist sentiments. This research establishes an analytical framework for China’s foreign policy choices in bilateral disputes based on this assumption. This analytical framework includes three independent variables and one dependent variable. The dependent variable is the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes. And the independent variables include the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of the particular bilateral relations, its perception of the priority of the various interests involved in the dispute, and its perception of the severity of the dispute. This research applies this analytical framework to the analysis of eight disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issues and historical issues, fourteen disputes between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue, economic and trade issues, and the issues of United States Armed Forces infringing China’s sovereignty, and six disputes between China and South Korea over the security issue, the fishing issue, and the historical issues. Through the analysis of these 28 bilateral international disputes, this research finds that, holding other variables constant, the Chinese government’s perception of the importance of a given set of bilateral relations is negatively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes, while the Chinese government’s perception of the priority of the interests involved in the dispute and its perception of the severity of the dispute are positively correlated with the degree of toughness of the foreign policies adopted by the Chinese government in bilateral international disputes."],"dc:format.checksum.md5":["757015429ea851d72d9c5474de91ffc2","87eda9de84448d1f82354d60eee3eb5f"],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.109635"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/a312703e-7e67-4412-a260-b10a015b05aa/download"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Cambridge"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/370051"],"dc:rights":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5b4df223-804f-4927-80aa-3bfaba5a0029/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"dc:rights.embargotype":["controlled.access"],"dc:subject":["China","foreign policy","nationalism","perception","Sino-Japanese relations","Sino-South Korean relations","Sino-U.S. relations"],"dc:title":["Nationalism or Cost-Benefit Analysis in Perception: The Logic of China’s Foreign Policy Choices in Bilateral Disputes in Post-Cold War Period"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["Doctoral"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:03Z"}