The Failed Internalisation of the European Convention on Human Rights in Russia: The Gap Between Values and Norms, and the Contested Meaning of Dignity
Despite the shortcomings of Russia’s legal and political systems, in 1996 the state was offered membership of the Council of Europe (CoE) based on a rhetorical commitment to the liberal democratic values of the organisation. Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and dialogue with Strasbourg promised to facilitate Russia’s transformation into a liberal democratic state founded on respect for human rights and the rule of law. Alas, this optimistic vision did not materialise. Until its expulsion from the CoE in 2022, Russia was one of the Member States with the worst compliance with the ECHR. Furthermore, from 2010 Russia began asserting a right to disagree with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the correct interpretation of Convention provisions if this was necessary to protect the values of the Russian Constitution. In this thesis, I examine a hitherto unexplored explanation for Russia’s failure to become a good complier with the ECHR. I argue that the internalisation of the ECHR in Russia was obstructed by the conceptual contestation of the Convention’s foundational values. In Russia and in the USSR, there was always a competing set of values through which the state interpreted its human rights obligations. These pre-existing values have shaped the meanings of dignity, liberty, equality, and rule of law in the state. Thus, although Russia incorporated its ECHR obligations in domestic law and learnt to use the language of ECHR values, it never accepted the liberal democratic meanings of these values in ECtHR jurisprudence. This plagued the dialogue between Russia and Strasbourg with mutual hostility and lack of understanding, thereby delimiting the persuasive authority of ECtHR judgments. The implications of the conceptual contestation of ECHR values on the internalisation of the ECHR in Russia will be examined in-depth by focusing on one particular value – dignity. I will show that the conception of inherent human dignity underpinning Strasbourg jurisprudence is not the meaning of dignity informing Russia’s interpretations of ECHR provisions. Instead, the dignity of the individual is perceived as a status acquired through conduct that upholds the pre-existing values which legitimise state authority. This home-grown conception of human dignity is closely linked to a view of the state as a dignified entity that embodies these values – that is, to state dignity.
compliance theories, dignity, ECHR, human rights, internalisation, Russia, values
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations