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University of Cambridge

Inconsistencies in Law

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Inconsistencies have been the object of study of numerous analytical legal philosophers like H. L. A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, Alf Ross, Norberto Bobbio, Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, Carlos Alchourrón, Eugenio Bulygin, and Pierluigi Chiassoni. Although these authors hold differing views on inconsistencies, I argue that they have all failed to arrive at a sound taxonomy of the different types of inconsistencies that can occur in the law. I claim that inconsistencies can be classified into two types, namely, contradictions and conflicts. I also contend that inconsistencies are not to be confused with improper inconsistencies, which do not concern instances of logical incompatibility between norms, but rather of functional incompatibility between them, which means that the application of one norm undermines the achievement of the goals or purposes pursued by another norm. The central claim of this dissertation is that a failure to differentiate between contradictions and conflicts as two types of inconsistencies as well as a failure to differentiate between inconsistencies and improper inconsistencies has often resulted in mistaken views about how inconsistencies affect the law’s ability to provide guidance and of how problems arising from inconsistencies in the law can be remedied. I examine the *Validity Thesis* (inconsistent norms can be simultaneously valid in a single legal system), the *Guidance Thesis* (inconsistencies undermine law’s ability to offer guidance to individuals’ conduct by rendering the law indeterminate), the *Interpretation-Creation Thesis* (inconsistencies are created by interpretation) and the *Modification of the Law Thesis* (the resolution of inconsistencies entails a modification of the legal system) with the purpose of showing how they are to be understood or, more precisely, what interpretation is to be given to them to make them correct.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Cambridge
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gueiros Dias, Daniela
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Vinx, Lars

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
DOI dc:identifier.doi
https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.107341
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/366384

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cambridge University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
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citation

Gueiros Dias, Daniela. Inconsistencies in Law. Doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2023. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.107341