Back to results

University of Cambridge

Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on existence and negative existentials

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis, I investigate the theories of existence of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), three of the founding figures of analytic philosophy. As to Frege and Russell, I challenge the common historical narrative according to which they developed and defended what is usually called the second-order theory of existence. This theory says, in short, that existence is a property that only properties of objects can have, rather than a property that objects can have. I argue that this standard narrative is historically inaccurate in several important and surprising ways. Frege did not hold a second-order theory of existence at all. His account of negative existentials—sentences of the form ‘X does not exist’ where what takes the place of ‘X’ is a singular term—has thus been misunderstood almost universally. Although it would be a mistake to classify Russell as a *second*-order theorist, he did develop (around 1918–1919) a theory that closely resembles the second-order theory of existence, which I discuss. But I first defend the traditional interpretation of his *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) according to which Russell was committed to an abundant ontology through his analysis of negative existentials. I then argue that in a transformative period in his thinking, namely the years 1910–1914, his position is unstable with respect to negative existentials in a way he never appears to have realised. As to the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921), I argue that he can be interpreted in two ways depending on how one understands the Tractarian analysis of propositions involving definite descriptions. On one interpretation, Wittgenstein’s theory of existence is very similar to Russell’s, on the other his theory is radically different.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Cambridge
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Cohen, Wouter
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Oliver, Alexander

Subjects

dc:subject × 8

Rights

dc:rights
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
DOI dc:identifier.doi
https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.104330
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/361543

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cambridge University
Base URL
api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Cohen, Wouter. Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on existence and negative existentials. Doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2023. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.104330