{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/350626"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/350626","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Teleology in the Law of International Organisations","abstract":"This thesis considers the nature and use of purposive legal reasoning in international law, and the particular role it plays in the law of international organisations (IOs). I begin by examining the concept of purpose, the multiple levels of abstraction at which it is identifiable, and the different ways it is operationalised in international legal argument. I demonstrate that in addition to its familiar hermeneutic role, teleological reasoning is used both to develop the law, and as a means of restraint. Common to all of these applications, however, is a normative foundation derived from the principle of good faith. Turning to IOs in particular, I argue that purpose plays an essential role in reconciling the divide between their constitutional and contractual dimensions, allowing them to exercise a will that is simultaneously autonomous and yet limited. A consequence of the very nature of IOs, therefore, is that their purposes are designed to serve as both a vivifying force and a source of limitation. The remainder of the thesis explores these dynamics through three case studies. The first examines the relationship between purpose and power. Drawing on early case law regarding the competences of the UN and the European Economic Community, I argue that a mid-century ‘teleological turn’ in legal reasoning saw a shift towards purpose as a tool of institution-building and away from its restraining function. The second explores the temporal dimension of purpose—whether and how it can change over time—focusing on the debates within the International Whaling Commission as its functions evolved, in practice, from managing a common exploitable resource to conserving whales as an end in and of itself. A final case study on the World Bank and its relationship with human rights illustrates the tension between the notion of ‘speciality’ in the law of IOs and the desire for harmony between the multiple purposes to which states commit themselves. Rather than seeing individual IOs as teleological ‘silos’, I propose an alternative approach which seeks to accommodate the purposes of an individual institution alongside wider horizontal and vertical goals. Overall, the thesis offers a holistic theory of teleological reasoning and its role in the law of IOs; one which recognises not only its familiar function as a source of empowerment, but also its potential as a means of restraint and, ultimately, of harmony.","abstract_html":"This thesis considers the nature and use of purposive legal reasoning in international law, and the particular role it plays in the law of international organisations (IOs). I begin by examining the concept of purpose, the multiple levels of abstraction at which it is identifiable, and the different ways it is operationalised in international legal argument. I demonstrate that in addition to its familiar hermeneutic role, teleological reasoning is used both to develop the law, and as a means of restraint. Common to all of these applications, however, is a normative foundation derived from the principle of good faith. Turning to IOs in particular, I argue that purpose plays an essential role in reconciling the divide between their constitutional and contractual dimensions, allowing them to exercise a will that is simultaneously autonomous and yet limited. A consequence of the very nature of IOs, therefore, is that their purposes are designed to serve as both a vivifying force and a source of limitation. The remainder of the thesis explores these dynamics through three case studies. The first examines the relationship between purpose and power. Drawing on early case law regarding the competences of the UN and the European Economic Community, I argue that a mid-century ‘teleological turn’ in legal reasoning saw a shift towards purpose as a tool of institution-building and away from its restraining function. The second explores the temporal dimension of purpose—whether and how it can change over time—focusing on the debates within the International Whaling Commission as its functions evolved, in practice, from managing a common exploitable resource to conserving whales as an end in and of itself. A final case study on the World Bank and its relationship with human rights illustrates the tension between the notion of ‘speciality’ in the law of IOs and the desire for harmony between the multiple purposes to which states commit themselves. Rather than seeing individual IOs as teleological ‘silos’, I propose an alternative approach which seeks to accommodate the purposes of an individual institution alongside wider horizontal and vertical goals. Overall, the thesis offers a holistic theory of teleological reasoning and its role in the law of IOs; one which recognises not only its familiar function as a source of empowerment, but also its potential as a means of restraint and, ultimately, of harmony.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Clark, Tim"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Benvenisti, Eyal"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-03-01","date_published":"2023-03-01","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:23Z","subjects":["Public International Law","International Organisations","Teleology","Treaty Interpretation","Object and Purpose","United Nations","International Whaling Commission","World Bank"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000169253979"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0001-6925-3979","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6925-3979","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.97056","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Benvenisti, Eyal"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["Cambridge Trust Cambridge Australia Scholarships"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Clark, Tim"]},{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000169253979"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2023-03-01"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/350626"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Public International Law","International Organisations","Teleology","Treaty Interpretation","Object and Purpose","United Nations","International Whaling Commission","World Bank"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargodate","label":"Dc Rights Embargodate","values":["2026-06-06"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargotype","label":"Dc Rights Embargotype","values":["embargo"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.97056"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/62971176-34aa-4540-b4b7-3ef88d5d063e/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis considers the nature and use of purposive legal reasoning in international law, and the particular role it plays in the law of international organisations (IOs). 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Drawing on early case law regarding the competences of the UN and the European Economic Community, I argue that a mid-century ‘teleological turn’ in legal reasoning saw a shift towards purpose as a tool of institution-building and away from its restraining function. The second explores the temporal dimension of purpose—whether and how it can change over time—focusing on the debates within the International Whaling Commission as its functions evolved, in practice, from managing a common exploitable resource to conserving whales as an end in and of itself. A final case study on the World Bank and its relationship with human rights illustrates the tension between the notion of ‘speciality’ in the law of IOs and the desire for harmony between the multiple purposes to which states commit themselves. Rather than seeing individual IOs as teleological ‘silos’, I propose an alternative approach which seeks to accommodate the purposes of an individual institution alongside wider horizontal and vertical goals. 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Drawing on early case law regarding the competences of the UN and the European Economic Community, I argue that a mid-century ‘teleological turn’ in legal reasoning saw a shift towards purpose as a tool of institution-building and away from its restraining function. The second explores the temporal dimension of purpose—whether and how it can change over time—focusing on the debates within the International Whaling Commission as its functions evolved, in practice, from managing a common exploitable resource to conserving whales as an end in and of itself. A final case study on the World Bank and its relationship with human rights illustrates the tension between the notion of ‘speciality’ in the law of IOs and the desire for harmony between the multiple purposes to which states commit themselves. Rather than seeing individual IOs as teleological ‘silos’, I propose an alternative approach which seeks to accommodate the purposes of an individual institution alongside wider horizontal and vertical goals. 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