Maʿnā, Shuʿūr and Mental Existence: Avicenna’s Theory of Intentionality
type: CreativeWork
description: The historical origin of the concept of intentionality is commonly traced to scholastic philosophers’ reception of Avicenna’s concept of maʿnā. Recently, many scholars have challenged this narrative and, as a result, initiated a debate among Avicennian scholars about whether maʿnā bears any connection to intentionality. My dissertation reconstructs Avicenna’s theory of maʿnā and intentionality to offer a new perspective on this debate. I begin by developing a focal- meaning reading of maʿnā. Although maʿnā means different things in different contexts, the different senses point to a focal meaning: maʿnā is the non-sensible cognitive factor. Thus, maʿnā is related to intentionality insofar as apprehending maʿnā goes hand in hand with intentionality. Any apprehension that receives or processes maʿnā is intentional. I then further investigate Avicenna’s view on the nature of intentionality through the metaphysics of intentional apprehension. I examine in what sense Avicenna thinks that the mental existence of maʿnā makes possible our knowledge of non-existent objects. His metaphysical picture is that quiddity has a two-way existence: concrete and mental existence. Concrete existence refers to the expression of quiddity in the world, whereas mental existence refers to the unveiling of quiddity in the mind. When a quiddity is unveiled in the mind but not expressed in the world, the mind then grasps knowledge of the quiddity that does not exist in the external world. This picture suggests that, for Avicenna, the nature of intentionality involves thinking about things such that the quiddity of things exists-in- the-mind. I call this position ‘the existential account of intentionality’. Aboutness, for Avicenna, is primarily a feature of a fundamental way of existence. Third, I explore whether Avicenna’s existential account of intentionality is committed to a naturalistic or phenomenal consciousness approach. I argue that neither approach characterises Avicenna’s account. In…
abstract: The historical origin of the concept of intentionality is commonly traced to scholastic philosophers’ reception of Avicenna’s concept of maʿnā. Recently, many scholars have challenged this narrative and, as a result, initiated a debate among Avicennian scholars about whether maʿnā bears any connection to intentionality. My dissertation reconstructs Avicenna’s theory of maʿnā and intentionality to offer a new perspective on this debate. I begin by developing a focal- meaning reading of maʿnā. Although maʿnā means different things in different contexts, the different senses point to a focal meaning: maʿnā is the non-sensible cognitive factor. Thus, maʿnā is related to intentionality insofar as apprehending maʿnā goes hand in hand with intentionality. Any apprehension that receives or processes maʿnā is intentional. I then further investigate Avicenna’s view on the nature of intentionality through the metaphysics of intentional apprehension. I examine in what sense Avicenna thinks that the mental existence of maʿnā makes possible our knowledge of non-existent objects. His metaphysical picture is that quiddity has a two-way existence: concrete and mental existence. Concrete existence refers to the expression of quiddity in the world, whereas mental existence refers to the unveiling of quiddity in the mind. When a quiddity is unveiled in the mind but not expressed in the world, the mind then grasps knowledge of the quiddity that does not exist in the external world. This picture suggests that, for Avicenna, the nature of intentionality involves thinking about things such that the quiddity of things exists-in- the-mind. I call this position ‘the existential account of intentionality’. Aboutness, for Avicenna, is primarily a feature of a fundamental way of existence. Third, I explore whether Avicenna’s existential account of intentionality is committed to a naturalistic or phenomenal consciousness approach. I argue that neither approach characterises Avicenna’s account. In…
author: Cai, Zhenyu
language: eng
keywords: Avicenna, Intentionality, Islamic Philosophy, History of Philosophy, maʿnā, Mental Existence
license: https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
date published: 2022-05-09
date modified: 2026-07-22T22:24:16Z
provider: Cambridge University
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: University of Cambridge

PropertyValue
property ID: DOI
value: 10.17863/CAM.86446