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University of Cambridge

The Machine–Organism Distinction

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The idea that analysis of organisms can proceed by distinguishing organisms from machines is common to many areas of philosophy. This thesis argues that our search for a philosophy of organisms should not proceed by defining or relying on a Machine–Organism Distinction (MOD). We are often able to take biological theories that are thought to characterize organ- isms, such as theories of organismal autonomy and stability, and apply them to machines. I argue that we should not provide an analysis of organisms according to an MOD because there is no distinction available that holds up to scrutiny and evidence. There have been several major attempts to provide an MOD. I divide these in consecutive chapters according to the property of organisms offered as an MOD: teleology (Nicholson 2013), autonomy (Mossio and Moreno 2015), stochasticity (Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016) and pro- cessual stability (Dupré and Nicholson 2018). I address these major attempts to provide an MOD by showing how each fails to provide an analysis of organisms that distinguishes them from machines. To do this, I examine a diversity of machines and organisms that serve as naturalistic counterexamples. Discoveries in molecular biology and ecology, as well as developments in robotics and biotechnology, show the failure of MODs in contemporary philosophy and biology. Moreover, not only does the MOD consistently fail, but philosophical arguments that rely upon MODs consistently misrepresent organisms themselves. I conclude with the idea that we should consider machines not as external to, or distinguished from, organisms, but as proper objects of biological science.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Cambridge
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Brunet, Tyler
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Lewens, Tim

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Author Identifier
0000-0002-7609-7254
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/324630

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cambridge University
Base URL
api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Brunet, Tyler. The Machine–Organism Distinction. Doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2021. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.72080