{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/324377"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/324377","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The doctrine of privity in negligence, 1842-1932","abstract":"This thesis seeks to better understand the path of the doctrine of privity in the law of negligence and, in particular, why it was in 1932 that it was finally ousted by Donoghue v Stevenson. It is suggested that the doctrine of privity was introduced into the developing law of negligence by a court concerned with commercial consequences but developed into a rigid rule by the early twentieth century. By the 1920s, certain legal and extra-legal factors may be said to have created a state of affairs supportive of the removal of privity from the law of negligence and the recognition of manufacturer liability. It is argued that the continued challenges faced by married women in suing on a contract, as well as the rise of consumerism, the increased availability of liability insurance and a changing conception of the nature of negligence are all contemporaneous factors or developments that are likely to have increased the pressure for a change in the law. This thesis also uncovers material in newspaper reports showing that, despite the outcomes one might expect given the privity rule, plaintiffs were successfully suing for personal injuries arising from the use of defective products. An explanation is suggested: the emergence, at the turn of the century, of a line of argument based on the supply of dangerous items. Results similar to Donoghue were being reached, prior to 1932, without any formal change to the rules. This was yet another factor contributing to a climate in which Mrs Donoghue’s claim might form a tipping point for change.","abstract_html":"This thesis seeks to better understand the path of the doctrine of privity in the law of negligence and, in particular, why it was in 1932 that it was finally ousted by Donoghue v Stevenson. It is suggested that the doctrine of privity was introduced into the developing law of negligence by a court concerned with commercial consequences but developed into a rigid rule by the early twentieth century. By the 1920s, certain legal and extra-legal factors may be said to have created a state of affairs supportive of the removal of privity from the law of negligence and the recognition of manufacturer liability. It is argued that the continued challenges faced by married women in suing on a contract, as well as the rise of consumerism, the increased availability of liability insurance and a changing conception of the nature of negligence are all contemporaneous factors or developments that are likely to have increased the pressure for a change in the law. This thesis also uncovers material in newspaper reports showing that, despite the outcomes one might expect given the privity rule, plaintiffs were successfully suing for personal injuries arising from the use of defective products. An explanation is suggested: the emergence, at the turn of the century, of a line of argument based on the supply of dangerous items. Results similar to Donoghue were being reached, prior to 1932, without any formal change to the rules. This was yet another factor contributing to a climate in which Mrs Donoghue’s claim might form a tipping point for change.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gordon, Emily"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Ibbetson, David"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-07-23","date_published":"2021-07-23","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:32Z","subjects":["Negligence","Legal history"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/a785b9e3-9005-4dc5-89e9-329740e6969f/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.71832","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Ibbetson, David"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["Maitland Studentship in Legal History (FW Maitland Memorial Fund) Hollond-Whittaker Research Studentship In Law (Trinity College)"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gordon, Emily"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2021-07-23"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/324377"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Negligence","Legal history"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/a785b9e3-9005-4dc5-89e9-329740e6969f/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargotype","label":"Dc Rights Embargotype","values":["controlled.access"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["10.17863/CAM.71832"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5b92e73d-d1d6-4424-a59d-a0cf485246a6/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis seeks to better understand the path of the doctrine of privity in the law of negligence and, in particular, why it was in 1932 that it was finally ousted by Donoghue v Stevenson. 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This thesis also uncovers material in newspaper reports showing that, despite the outcomes one might expect given the privity rule, plaintiffs were successfully suing for personal injuries arising from the use of defective products. An explanation is suggested: the emergence, at the turn of the century, of a line of argument based on the supply of dangerous items. Results similar to Donoghue were being reached, prior to 1932, without any formal change to the rules. 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