Abstract
dc:description.abstractInsurgency and counterinsurgency in the developing world were crucial aspects of the global Cold War. Economic, political, religious, and social factors created tensions at the international, national, and local levels that drove conflict. Scholars can gain an increased understanding of these characteristics through the study of historical examples, such as the Cuban-inspired insurgency against the government of Peru. The leaders of the Cuban government wanted to export their revolution throughout Latin America and turn the Peruvian Andes into the Sierra Maestra of South America. As a result, members of the New Left in Peru began an insurgency in 1962. By 1966, the Peruvian security forces had quickly and efficiently eliminated the insurgent threat. Most literature on the Peruvian Cold War experience of the mid-1960s argues the New Left failed due to internal mistakes. I combine recently uncovered documents and reinterpret the existing literature to show that it was the competence of the Peruvian security forces, not the incompetence of the insurgents, that resulted in a government victory. ‘Victory’, however, is an elusive term, there were numerous outcomes, some positive, some negative, which had a profound impact on Peruvian society and hemispheric security. This dissertation examines these understudied events and seeks to explain their significance in the context of Latin America’s Cold War story.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- Doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Cambridge
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Heeg, Jason
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Foster, William
Subjects
dc:subject × 7Rights
dc:rightsIdentifiers
dc:identifier.*- DOI dc:identifier.doi
- https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.60029
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/312932