{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/309358"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/309358","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Plato's Symposium: the Other Half. A study of Phaedrus', Pausanias', and Eryximachus' Speeches (Symposium, 178a6-188e4)","abstract":"This thesis is primarily a study of the first three speeches uttered in praise of Erôs in Plato's Symposium (178a6-188e4). Less studied than the following speeches, these encomia are often dismissed as lacking in argumentative consistency, cultural originality, and philosophical insights. I disprove these three criticisms by showing that, in each discourse, the line of argumentation is stronger than appears at first sight, the views of erôs are far from conventional, and genuine philosophical questions are raised: can erôs be viewed as leading to courage (Phaedrus), wisdom (Pausanias), or harmony (Eryximachus) without being denied some of its essential features — inconstancy, desire and pleasure? The thesis is also centrally concerned with two more general questions about the way the Platonic dialogue works as a whole. (1) What is the nature of the contest over wisdom in which all the speakers are involved? I argue that the challenge issued by Eryximachus at the start of the dialogue (177a2-d5) is not to just praise erôs but to reveal how the emotion is conducive to the highest kind of benefits for human beings: virtue and happiness, each speaker being led as a result to advocate, beyond a vision of erôs, a particular ideal of human excellence. (2) How does Diotima's speech relate to the previous ones? I argue that the priestess does not just dismiss the first speeches (Rowe), nor further develops some insights roughly presented in the first speeches (Sheffield): rather, she solves questions raised by them. The final purpose of the study is to better understand why Plato chose to express his views through various voices in his dialogue.","abstract_html":"This thesis is primarily a study of the first three speeches uttered in praise of Erôs in Plato&#x27;s Symposium (178a6-188e4). Less studied than the following speeches, these encomia are often dismissed as lacking in argumentative consistency, cultural originality, and philosophical insights. I disprove these three criticisms by showing that, in each discourse, the line of argumentation is stronger than appears at first sight, the views of erôs are far from conventional, and genuine philosophical questions are raised: can erôs be viewed as leading to courage (Phaedrus), wisdom (Pausanias), or harmony (Eryximachus) without being denied some of its essential features — inconstancy, desire and pleasure? The thesis is also centrally concerned with two more general questions about the way the Platonic dialogue works as a whole. (1) What is the nature of the contest over wisdom in which all the speakers are involved? I argue that the challenge issued by Eryximachus at the start of the dialogue (177a2-d5) is not to just praise erôs but to reveal how the emotion is conducive to the highest kind of benefits for human beings: virtue and happiness, each speaker being led as a result to advocate, beyond a vision of erôs, a particular ideal of human excellence. (2) How does Diotima&#x27;s speech relate to the previous ones? I argue that the priestess does not just dismiss the first speeches (Rowe), nor further develops some insights roughly presented in the first speeches (Sheffield): rather, she solves questions raised by them. The final purpose of the study is to better understand why Plato chose to express his views through various voices in his dialogue.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Keime, Christian"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Hunter, Richard"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-03-27","date_published":"2020-03-27","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:07Z","subjects":["Plato","Symposium","Phaedrus","Pausanias","Eryximachus","Socrates","Diotima","eros","love","arêtê","virtue","eudiamonia","happiness","encomion","Greek Philosophy","Ancient Greek Ethics"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/7f17bf7e-5ebd-4852-b112-32fc5de973f6/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.56449","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Hunter, Richard"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Keime, Christian"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020-03-27"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/309358"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Plato","Symposium","Phaedrus","Pausanias","Eryximachus","Socrates","Diotima","eros","love","arêtê","virtue","eudiamonia","happiness","encomion","Greek Philosophy","Ancient Greek Ethics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/7f17bf7e-5ebd-4852-b112-32fc5de973f6/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargodate","label":"Dc Rights Embargodate","values":["2025-08-19"]},{"key":"dc:rights.embargotype","label":"Dc Rights Embargotype","values":["embargo"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["10.17863/CAM.56449"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/51ccc3b1-089b-4772-a820-fa8f7f991f2b/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis is primarily a study of the first three speeches uttered in praise of Erôs in Plato's Symposium (178a6-188e4). Less studied than the following speeches, these encomia are often dismissed as lacking in argumentative consistency, cultural originality, and philosophical insights. I disprove these three criticisms by showing that, in each discourse, the line of argumentation is stronger than appears at first sight, the views of erôs are far from conventional, and genuine philosophical questions are raised: can erôs be viewed as leading to courage (Phaedrus), wisdom (Pausanias), or harmony (Eryximachus) without being denied some of its essential features — inconstancy, desire and pleasure? The thesis is also centrally concerned with two more general questions about the way the Platonic dialogue works as a whole. (1) What is the nature of the contest over wisdom in which all the speakers are involved? I argue that the challenge issued by Eryximachus at the start of the dialogue (177a2-d5) is not to just praise erôs but to reveal how the emotion is conducive to the highest kind of benefits for human beings: virtue and happiness, each speaker being led as a result to advocate, beyond a vision of erôs, a particular ideal of human excellence. (2) How does Diotima's speech relate to the previous ones? I argue that the priestess does not just dismiss the first speeches (Rowe), nor further develops some insights roughly presented in the first speeches (Sheffield): rather, she solves questions raised by them. The final purpose of the study is to better understand why Plato chose to express his views through various voices in his dialogue."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["3c16690aed95079798ea8aa7ad1506d5","87eda9de84448d1f82354d60eee3eb5f"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Plato's Symposium: the Other Half. A study of Phaedrus', Pausanias', and Eryximachus' Speeches (Symposium, 178a6-188e4)"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Hunter, Richard"],"dc:creator":["Keime, Christian"],"dc:date.issued":["2020-03-27"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis is primarily a study of the first three speeches uttered in praise of Erôs in Plato's Symposium (178a6-188e4). Less studied than the following speeches, these encomia are often dismissed as lacking in argumentative consistency, cultural originality, and philosophical insights. I disprove these three criticisms by showing that, in each discourse, the line of argumentation is stronger than appears at first sight, the views of erôs are far from conventional, and genuine philosophical questions are raised: can erôs be viewed as leading to courage (Phaedrus), wisdom (Pausanias), or harmony (Eryximachus) without being denied some of its essential features — inconstancy, desire and pleasure? The thesis is also centrally concerned with two more general questions about the way the Platonic dialogue works as a whole. (1) What is the nature of the contest over wisdom in which all the speakers are involved? I argue that the challenge issued by Eryximachus at the start of the dialogue (177a2-d5) is not to just praise erôs but to reveal how the emotion is conducive to the highest kind of benefits for human beings: virtue and happiness, each speaker being led as a result to advocate, beyond a vision of erôs, a particular ideal of human excellence. (2) How does Diotima's speech relate to the previous ones? I argue that the priestess does not just dismiss the first speeches (Rowe), nor further develops some insights roughly presented in the first speeches (Sheffield): rather, she solves questions raised by them. 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