{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/304747"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/304747","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"What's the Matter? Toward a Neo-Aristotelian Ontology of Nature","abstract":"This thesis contributes to the development of a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ ontology of powers that accommodates quantum phenomena. It offers a number of philosophical objections to ‘Super-Humean’ metaphysics, and constructs a sequence of models that aim to improve upon it, using the metaphysical toolbox constructed in Part I. In Part II, I explore how quantum entanglement challenges the ‘classical’ conception of the world as consisting of particles (or fields) with intrinsic physical properties (Chapter 3). I consider the metaphysical model offered by Super-Humeanism, which accommodates entanglement by combining a ‘primitive ontology approach’ to quantum mechanics with ontic structural realism (Chapter 4). According to Super-Humeans, the world is made of matter points constituted by distance relations. I raise three objections to its structuralist conception of matter. I then propose an alternative semi-Humean model, ‘Bohmian power structuralism’, which overcomes these objections through an ontology of ‘power-atoms’ with multi-track causal powers (Chapter 5). But its Humean conception of laws can be challenged. A second model, ‘power monism’, enriches the primitive ontology to include a ‘cosmic power’ that transforms the power-atoms into a cosmic whole, and supports an Aristotelian-essentialist conception of laws (Chapter 6). This model overcomes the difficulties with power structuralism, but is susceptible to Hawthorne’s ‘extrinsicality’ argument, excluding consciousness from the physical world. In Part III, I consider the emergence of thermochemical properties within macroscopic (or mesoscopic) quantum systems. Metaphysical models that incorporate only finite degrees of freedom, like Super-Humeanism, cannot accommodate properties like temperature and chemical entropy, which are represented in physics in the ‘thermodynamic limit’ (Chapter 7). I offer an additional argument against adopting a reductionist approach based on Putnam’s ‘permutation argument’ (Chapter 8). Finally, I outline a third model, ‘power pluralism’, in which the world consists of: a substrate of ‘power-gunk’, and ‘substantial powers’ that elicit substances from the power-gunk (Chapter 9). In this model, quantum-entangled microscopic particles are potential parts of macroscopic (or mesoscopic) substances, which have intrinsic thermochemical properties.","abstract_html":"This thesis contributes to the development of a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ ontology of powers that accommodates quantum phenomena. It offers a number of philosophical objections to ‘Super-Humean’ metaphysics, and constructs a sequence of models that aim to improve upon it, using the metaphysical toolbox constructed in Part I. In Part II, I explore how quantum entanglement challenges the ‘classical’ conception of the world as consisting of particles (or fields) with intrinsic physical properties (Chapter 3). I consider the metaphysical model offered by Super-Humeanism, which accommodates entanglement by combining a ‘primitive ontology approach’ to quantum mechanics with ontic structural realism (Chapter 4). According to Super-Humeans, the world is made of matter points constituted by distance relations. I raise three objections to its structuralist conception of matter. I then propose an alternative semi-Humean model, ‘Bohmian power structuralism’, which overcomes these objections through an ontology of ‘power-atoms’ with multi-track causal powers (Chapter 5). But its Humean conception of laws can be challenged. A second model, ‘power monism’, enriches the primitive ontology to include a ‘cosmic power’ that transforms the power-atoms into a cosmic whole, and supports an Aristotelian-essentialist conception of laws (Chapter 6). This model overcomes the difficulties with power structuralism, but is susceptible to Hawthorne’s ‘extrinsicality’ argument, excluding consciousness from the physical world. In Part III, I consider the emergence of thermochemical properties within macroscopic (or mesoscopic) quantum systems. Metaphysical models that incorporate only finite degrees of freedom, like Super-Humeanism, cannot accommodate properties like temperature and chemical entropy, which are represented in physics in the ‘thermodynamic limit’ (Chapter 7). I offer an additional argument against adopting a reductionist approach based on Putnam’s ‘permutation argument’ (Chapter 8). Finally, I outline a third model, ‘power pluralism’, in which the world consists of: a substrate of ‘power-gunk’, and ‘substantial powers’ that elicit substances from the power-gunk (Chapter 9). In this model, quantum-entangled microscopic particles are potential parts of macroscopic (or mesoscopic) substances, which have intrinsic thermochemical properties.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Simpson, William Michael Richard"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Chang, Hasok","Marenbon, John"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-06-01","date_published":"2020-06-01","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:10Z","subjects":["primitive ontology","quantum entanglement","metaphysics of science","Humeanism","Super-Humeanism","powers ontology","hylomorphism","metaphysical grounding","emergence","Putnam's paradox","Bohmian mechanics","wave function collapse","reductionism","power structuralism","microphysicalism","substance ontology"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/52473822-58cd-49eb-8ef1-da34a9b664f0/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000267345711"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0002-6734-5711","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6734-5711","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.51828","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Chang, Hasok","Marenbon, John"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["Blacker-Loewe Full Doctoral Studentship in Philosophy (Peterhouse)"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Simpson, William Michael Richard"]},{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0000000267345711"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020-06-01"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/304747"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["primitive ontology","quantum entanglement","metaphysics of science","Humeanism","Super-Humeanism","powers ontology","hylomorphism","metaphysical grounding","emergence","Putnam's paradox","Bohmian mechanics","wave function collapse","reductionism","power structuralism","microphysicalism","substance ontology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/52473822-58cd-49eb-8ef1-da34a9b664f0/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["10.17863/CAM.51828"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/1ace1c5f-1212-47f2-b2a5-5836ea360047/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis contributes to the development of a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ ontology of powers that accommodates quantum phenomena. 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A second model, ‘power monism’, enriches the primitive ontology to include a ‘cosmic power’ that transforms the power-atoms into a cosmic whole, and supports an Aristotelian-essentialist conception of laws (Chapter 6). This model overcomes the difficulties with power structuralism, but is susceptible to Hawthorne’s ‘extrinsicality’ argument, excluding consciousness from the physical world. In Part III, I consider the emergence of thermochemical properties within macroscopic (or mesoscopic) quantum systems. Metaphysical models that incorporate only finite degrees of freedom, like Super-Humeanism, cannot accommodate properties like temperature and chemical entropy, which are represented in physics in the ‘thermodynamic limit’ (Chapter 7). I offer an additional argument against adopting a reductionist approach based on Putnam’s ‘permutation argument’ (Chapter 8). 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This model overcomes the difficulties with power structuralism, but is susceptible to Hawthorne’s ‘extrinsicality’ argument, excluding consciousness from the physical world. In Part III, I consider the emergence of thermochemical properties within macroscopic (or mesoscopic) quantum systems. Metaphysical models that incorporate only finite degrees of freedom, like Super-Humeanism, cannot accommodate properties like temperature and chemical entropy, which are represented in physics in the ‘thermodynamic limit’ (Chapter 7). I offer an additional argument against adopting a reductionist approach based on Putnam’s ‘permutation argument’ (Chapter 8). Finally, I outline a third model, ‘power pluralism’, in which the world consists of: a substrate of ‘power-gunk’, and ‘substantial powers’ that elicit substances from the power-gunk (Chapter 9). 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