Preferences and Cooperation
type: CreativeWork
description: Chapter 1: Evolution of reciprocator preferences when agents can pay for information A benchmark result in the evolutionary games literature is that a preference for reciprocity will evolve if preferences are observable (at zero cost), since reciprocators can cooperate with each other rather than with materialists, thereby achieving a fitness advantage. I investigate how a preference for reciprocity evolves if individuals can observe an opponent's preferences only by bearing a fitness cost. My main result applies when observing an opponent's type is cheap, but cooperating only gives a modest fitness advantage or the preference for reciprocity is intense. In this case, a preference for reciprocity cannot evolve from a small starting share in the mix of preferences, even if discovering an opponent's preferences is arbitrarily cheap. This is in sharp contrast to the benchmark result. Chapter 2: A theory of conditional cooperation on networks (with Julien Gagnon) Chapter 2 is a study of reciprocity on social networks. We model a group of connected agents who play a one-shot public good game. Some players are materialists and others are reciprocators. We characterise the maximal Nash equilibrium (ME) of this game for any network and a broad class of reciprocal preferences. At the ME, a novel concept, the q-linked set, fully determines the set of players who contribute. We show that influential players are those connected to players who are sufficiently interconnected, but not too much. Finally, we study the decision of a planner faced with an uncertain type profile who designs the network to maximise expected contributions. The ex ante optimal network comprises isolated cliques of degree k*, with k* decreasing with the incidence of materialists. We discuss an important application of our results: the workplace. Chapter 3: Ideological games Chapter 3 is a theory of ideology. I define a preference type to be a set of first-order preferences over the outcomes of a `game of …
abstract: Chapter 1: Evolution of reciprocator preferences when agents can pay for information A benchmark result in the evolutionary games literature is that a preference for reciprocity will evolve if preferences are observable (at zero cost), since reciprocators can cooperate with each other rather than with materialists, thereby achieving a fitness advantage. I investigate how a preference for reciprocity evolves if individuals can observe an opponent's preferences only by bearing a fitness cost. My main result applies when observing an opponent's type is cheap, but cooperating only gives a modest fitness advantage or the preference for reciprocity is intense. In this case, a preference for reciprocity cannot evolve from a small starting share in the mix of preferences, even if discovering an opponent's preferences is arbitrarily cheap. This is in sharp contrast to the benchmark result. Chapter 2: A theory of conditional cooperation on networks (with Julien Gagnon) Chapter 2 is a study of reciprocity on social networks. We model a group of connected agents who play a one-shot public good game. Some players are materialists and others are reciprocators. We characterise the maximal Nash equilibrium (ME) of this game for any network and a broad class of reciprocal preferences. At the ME, a novel concept, the q-linked set, fully determines the set of players who contribute. We show that influential players are those connected to players who are sufficiently interconnected, but not too much. Finally, we study the decision of a planner faced with an uncertain type profile who designs the network to maximise expected contributions. The ex ante optimal network comprises isolated cliques of degree k*, with k* decreasing with the incidence of materialists. We discuss an important application of our results: the workplace. Chapter 3: Ideological games Chapter 3 is a theory of ideology. I define a preference type to be a set of first-order preferences over the outcomes of a `game of …
author: Harris, Alexander Nicholas Edward
language: en
keywords: Evolutionary games, Microeconomic behaviour, Networks, Decision-making under risk and uncetainty
license: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/a7cb6f3e-e81d-4db7-a027-6a681e2d6b97/download
license: https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
date published: 2019-01-14
date modified: 2026-07-22T22:23:56Z
provider: Cambridge University
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: University of Cambridge

PropertyValue
property ID: DOI
value: 10.17863/CAM.35248