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University of Cambridge

Privacy engineering for social networks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this dissertation, I enumerate several privacy problems in online social networks (OSNs) and describe a system called Footlights that addresses them. Footlights is a platform for distributed social applications that allows users to control the sharing of private information. It is designed to compete with the performance of today's centralised OSNs, but it does not trust centralised infrastructure to enforce security properties. Based on several socio-technical scenarios, I extract concrete technical problems to be solved and show how the existing research literature does not solve them. Addressing these problems fully would fundamentally change users' interactions with OSNs, providing real control over online sharing. I also demonstrate that today's OSNs do not provide this control: both user data and the social graph are vulnerable to practical privacy attacks. Footlights' storage substrate provides private, scalable, sharable storage using untrusted servers. Under realistic assumptions, the direct cost of operating this storage system is less than one US dollar per user-year. It is the foundation for a practical shared filesystem, a perfectly unobservable communications channel and a distributed application platform. The Footlights application platform allows third-party developers to write social applications without direct access to users' private data. Applications run in a confined environment with a private-by-default security model: applications can only access user information with explicit user consent. I demonstrate that practical applications can be written on this platform. The security of Footlights user data is based on public-key cryptography, but users are able to log in to the system without carrying a private key on a hardware token. Instead, users authenticate to a set of authentication agents using a weak secret such as a user-chosen password or randomly-assigned 4-digit number. The protocol is designed to be secure even in the face of malicious authentication agents.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Cambridge
Year dc:date.issued
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Anderson, Jonathan

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
DOI dc:identifier.doi
https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.16377
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/244239

Chain of custody

source
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Cambridge University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
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citation

Anderson, Jonathan. Privacy engineering for social networks. Doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.16377