{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/226170"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/226170","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"A reverse counterfactual analysis of causation","abstract":"Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, where c and e are events, C and E are the propositions that c and e respectively occur, ~ is negation and > is the counterfactual conditional. The purpose of my project is to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation which departs signigicantly from Lewis’s starting point, and thus can hope to solve several stubborn problems for that approach. Whereas Lewis starts with a sufficiency claim, my analysis claims that a certain counterfactual is necessary for causation. I say that, if c causes e, then ~ E > ~ C — I call the latter the Reverse Counterfactual. This will often, perhaps always, be a backtracking counterfactual, so two chapters are devoted to defending a conception of counterfactuals which allows backtracking. Thus prepared, I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes, but not of mere conditions for an effect. This provides a neat analysis of the principles governing causal selection, which is extended in a discussion of causal transitivity. Standard counterfactual accounts suffer counterexamples from preemption, but I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual has resources to deal neatly with those too. Finally I argue that the Reverse counterfactual, as a necessary condition on causation, is the most we can hope for: in principle, there can be no counterfactual sufficient condition for causation.","abstract_html":"Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, where c and e are events, C and E are the propositions that c and e respectively occur, ~ is negation and > is the counterfactual conditional. The purpose of my project is to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation which departs signigicantly from Lewis’s starting point, and thus can hope to solve several stubborn problems for that approach. Whereas Lewis starts with a sufficiency claim, my analysis claims that a certain counterfactual is necessary for causation. I say that, if c causes e, then ~ E > ~ C — I call the latter the Reverse Counterfactual. This will often, perhaps always, be a backtracking counterfactual, so two chapters are devoted to defending a conception of counterfactuals which allows backtracking. Thus prepared, I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes, but not of mere conditions for an effect. This provides a neat analysis of the principles governing causal selection, which is extended in a discussion of causal transitivity. Standard counterfactual accounts suffer counterexamples from preemption, but I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual has resources to deal neatly with those too. Finally I argue that the Reverse counterfactual, as a necessary condition on causation, is the most we can hope for: in principle, there can be no counterfactual sufficient condition for causation.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Broadbent, Alex"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2007,"date_issued":"2007-11-20","date_published":"2007-11-20","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:16Z","subjects":["Causation","Counterfactual","Selection","Explanation","Preemption","Backtracker"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5683239e-1317-4ccf-9177-028e83009fb1/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.16166","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["This work was supported by a Domestic Research Studentship."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Broadbent, Alex"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2007-11-20"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/226170","https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/226170"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Causation","Counterfactual","Selection","Explanation","Preemption","Backtracker"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5683239e-1317-4ccf-9177-028e83009fb1/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["10.17863/CAM.16166"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/18f37567-a1f3-4848-be1e-585763e70eac/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, where c and e are events, C and E are the propositions that c and e respectively occur, ~ is negation and > is the counterfactual conditional. The purpose of my project is to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation which departs signigicantly from Lewis’s starting point, and thus can hope to solve several stubborn problems for that approach. Whereas Lewis starts with a sufficiency claim, my analysis claims that a certain counterfactual is necessary for causation. I say that, if c causes e, then ~ E > ~ C — I call the latter the Reverse Counterfactual. This will often, perhaps always, be a backtracking counterfactual, so two chapters are devoted to defending a conception of counterfactuals which allows backtracking. Thus prepared, I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes, but not of mere conditions for an effect. This provides a neat analysis of the principles governing causal selection, which is extended in a discussion of causal transitivity. Standard counterfactual accounts suffer counterexamples from preemption, but I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual has resources to deal neatly with those too. Finally I argue that the Reverse counterfactual, as a necessary condition on causation, is the most we can hope for: in principle, there can be no counterfactual sufficient condition for causation."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["ec932a9c0c6c865d9cb4b36c6ee763ad","48dcdf38f646da27e5e4bc6c1893d4fc"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A reverse counterfactual analysis of causation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["This work was supported by a Domestic Research Studentship."],"dc:creator":["Broadbent, Alex"],"dc:date.issued":["2007-11-20"],"dc:description.abstract":["Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, where c and e are events, C and E are the propositions that c and e respectively occur, ~ is negation and > is the counterfactual conditional. 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Standard counterfactual accounts suffer counterexamples from preemption, but I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual has resources to deal neatly with those too. Finally I argue that the Reverse counterfactual, as a necessary condition on causation, is the most we can hope for: in principle, there can be no counterfactual sufficient condition for causation."],"dc:format.checksum.md5":["ec932a9c0c6c865d9cb4b36c6ee763ad","48dcdf38f646da27e5e4bc6c1893d4fc"],"dc:identifier.doi":["10.17863/CAM.16166"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/18f37567-a1f3-4848-be1e-585763e70eac/download"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Cambridge"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri":["http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/226170","https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/226170"],"dc:rights":["https://apollo8-f-pro.lib.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/5683239e-1317-4ccf-9177-028e83009fb1/download","https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/"],"dc:subject":["Causation","Counterfactual","Selection","Explanation","Preemption","Backtracker"],"dc:title":["A reverse counterfactual analysis of causation"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["Doctoral"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:16Z"}