{"id":{"repo_id":"calgary","oai_identifier":"oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:1880/114076"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/calgary/oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:1880/114076","repository":{"repo_id":"calgary","name":"University of Calgary","base_url":"https://ucalgary.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Towards MDI QKD using Quantum Dot Single Photon Sources","abstract":"It is only a matter of time until quantum computers will be capable of breaking all of our current encryption. In the light of this cryptography crisis, it is vital to experimentally realize Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, which are information-theoretic secure. This form of security, which has never been possible with classical cryptography protocols, states that the protocol will remain equally secure regardless of the computational power of eavesdroppers and hackers. Although one form of QKD is already commercially available, it is susceptible to side-channel attacks based on flaws in how it is physically implemented. The most common attacks are detector-based attacks, and photon-number splitting attacks. For my thesis, I designed the first implementation of Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) using quantum dot single photon sources. This form of QKD is not only information-theoretic secure, but also inherently secure against all possible detector and photon-number-splitting side-channel attacks.","abstract_html":"It is only a matter of time until quantum computers will be capable of breaking all of our current encryption. In the light of this cryptography crisis, it is vital to experimentally realize Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, which are information-theoretic secure. This form of security, which has never been possible with classical cryptography protocols, states that the protocol will remain equally secure regardless of the computational power of eavesdroppers and hackers. Although one form of QKD is already commercially available, it is susceptible to side-channel attacks based on flaws in how it is physically implemented. The most common attacks are detector-based attacks, and photon-number splitting attacks. For my thesis, I designed the first implementation of Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) using quantum dot single photon sources. This form of QKD is not only information-theoretic secure, but also inherently secure against all possible detector and photon-number-splitting side-channel attacks.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Owen, Kim A."],"institution":"Science","degree_name":"Master of Science (MSc)","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Physics & Astronomy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Oblak, Daniel"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Simon, Christoph","Donovan, Eric","Gomes da Rocha, Claudia"],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-10","date_published":"2021-10","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:30:15Z","subjects":["Quantum Optics","Quantum","Cryptography","information-theoretic","Security","Quantum Dots","QKD","MDI"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. 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This form of security, which has never been possible with classical cryptography protocols, states that the protocol will remain equally secure regardless of the computational power of eavesdroppers and hackers. Although one form of QKD is already commercially available, it is susceptible to side-channel attacks based on flaws in how it is physically implemented. The most common attacks are detector-based attacks, and photon-number splitting attacks. For my thesis, I designed the first implementation of Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) using quantum dot single photon sources. 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