{"id":{"repo_id":"calgary","oai_identifier":"oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:1880/113548"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/calgary/oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:1880/113548","repository":{"repo_id":"calgary","name":"University of Calgary","base_url":"https://ucalgary.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Epistemic Implications of Scientific Consensus and Dissent","abstract":"Consensus and dissent play important roles in science. Both scientific consensus and dissent are said to be epistemically beneficial: consensus is often taken as a mark of knowledge and as a basis for informing decision-making and policy, whereas dissent is often taken as being necessary for scientific advancement, as it can challenge existing knowledge and offer new insights. However, it is unclear how consensus and dissent compare as methods of inquiry and whether they are equally epistemically beneficial. In this thesis, I explore epistemic implications of two accounts of epistemically justified consensus in science and argue these accounts are practically or conceptually problematic. I also discuss the epistemic implications of scientific dissent. I conclude that scientific dissent offers more epistemic benefits than scientific consensus, but that not all dissent is epistemically beneficial: some dissent hinders or impedes science. As such, mechanisms need to be developed to mitigate the epistemic harms caused by epistemically detrimental dissent.","abstract_html":"Consensus and dissent play important roles in science. Both scientific consensus and dissent are said to be epistemically beneficial: consensus is often taken as a mark of knowledge and as a basis for informing decision-making and policy, whereas dissent is often taken as being necessary for scientific advancement, as it can challenge existing knowledge and offer new insights. However, it is unclear how consensus and dissent compare as methods of inquiry and whether they are equally epistemically beneficial. In this thesis, I explore epistemic implications of two accounts of epistemically justified consensus in science and argue these accounts are practically or conceptually problematic. I also discuss the epistemic implications of scientific dissent. I conclude that scientific dissent offers more epistemic benefits than scientific consensus, but that not all dissent is epistemically beneficial: some dissent hinders or impedes science. As such, mechanisms need to be developed to mitigate the epistemic harms caused by epistemically detrimental dissent.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Stephenson, Chloe Maria"],"institution":"Arts","degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Ereshefsky, Marc"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Delehanty, Megan","Waters, C. Kenneth","Ereshefsky, Marc"],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-06-22","date_published":"2021-06-22","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:30:27Z","subjects":["scientific consensus","scientific dissent","epistemically justified consensus","epistemically detrimental dissent","philosophy of science","social epistemology"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/38953"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/38953","href":"http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/38953","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1880/113548","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Ereshefsky, Marc"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Delehanty, Megan","Waters, C. 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Both scientific consensus and dissent are said to be epistemically beneficial: consensus is often taken as a mark of knowledge and as a basis for informing decision-making and policy, whereas dissent is often taken as being necessary for scientific advancement, as it can challenge existing knowledge and offer new insights. However, it is unclear how consensus and dissent compare as methods of inquiry and whether they are equally epistemically beneficial. In this thesis, I explore epistemic implications of two accounts of epistemically justified consensus in science and argue these accounts are practically or conceptually problematic. I also discuss the epistemic implications of scientific dissent. I conclude that scientific dissent offers more epistemic benefits than scientific consensus, but that not all dissent is epistemically beneficial: some dissent hinders or impedes science. As such, mechanisms need to be developed to mitigate the epistemic harms caused by epistemically detrimental dissent."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Epistemic Implications of Scientific Consensus and Dissent"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Ereshefsky, Marc"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Delehanty, Megan","Waters, C. Kenneth","Ereshefsky, Marc"],"dc:creator":["Stephenson, Chloe Maria"],"dc:date":["2021-11"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-06-28T18:54:15Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-06-28T18:54:15Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2021-06-22"],"dc:description.abstract":["Consensus and dissent play important roles in science. Both scientific consensus and dissent are said to be epistemically beneficial: consensus is often taken as a mark of knowledge and as a basis for informing decision-making and policy, whereas dissent is often taken as being necessary for scientific advancement, as it can challenge existing knowledge and offer new insights. However, it is unclear how consensus and dissent compare as methods of inquiry and whether they are equally epistemically beneficial. In this thesis, I explore epistemic implications of two accounts of epistemically justified consensus in science and argue these accounts are practically or conceptually problematic. I also discuss the epistemic implications of scientific dissent. I conclude that scientific dissent offers more epistemic benefits than scientific consensus, but that not all dissent is epistemically beneficial: some dissent hinders or impedes science. 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