{"id":{"repo_id":"calgary","oai_identifier":"oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:1880/110703"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/calgary/oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:1880/110703","repository":{"repo_id":"calgary","name":"University of Calgary","base_url":"https://ucalgary.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Tracing Pathways and Decomposing Mechanisms in Ecology","abstract":"The term ‘mechanism’ is ubiquitous in biology. This has caused philosophers of biology to closely examine what mechanisms are. Many characteristics of mechanisms have been generated by philosophers calling their movement the New Mechanist Philosophy, with some proponents even going as far to say that biology is fundamentally a science of mechanisms. This means that the activity of biologists is organized around the discovery, investigation, and understanding of mechanisms and offering mechanistic explanations. But other terms are also employed by scientists, like ‘pathway.’ Carl Craver, a New Mechanist, claims that ‘mechanism’ can do the work of ‘pathway’ and equates these terms (2007, 3). However, this fundamentalist approach runs afoul of the messy conceptual practices that real scientists engage in. I examine a case from ecology where ecologists are engaged in conceptual practices, employing the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘pathway’ in their explanation. What I learn from this case is that the terms are designating concepts, which are designating scientific explanations, or objects of scientific knowledge. Instead of equating these terms, I argue that for a better understanding of scientific practice, these concepts designated by terms are to be thought of as cognitive tools, aiding the scientists to achieve their aims.","abstract_html":"The term ‘mechanism’ is ubiquitous in biology. This has caused philosophers of biology to closely examine what mechanisms are. Many characteristics of mechanisms have been generated by philosophers calling their movement the New Mechanist Philosophy, with some proponents even going as far to say that biology is fundamentally a science of mechanisms. This means that the activity of biologists is organized around the discovery, investigation, and understanding of mechanisms and offering mechanistic explanations. But other terms are also employed by scientists, like ‘pathway.’ Carl Craver, a New Mechanist, claims that ‘mechanism’ can do the work of ‘pathway’ and equates these terms (2007, 3). However, this fundamentalist approach runs afoul of the messy conceptual practices that real scientists engage in. I examine a case from ecology where ecologists are engaged in conceptual practices, employing the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘pathway’ in their explanation. What I learn from this case is that the terms are designating concepts, which are designating scientific explanations, or objects of scientific knowledge. Instead of equating these terms, I argue that for a better understanding of scientific practice, these concepts designated by terms are to be thought of as cognitive tools, aiding the scientists to achieve their aims.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Perkins, Timothy James"],"institution":"Arts","degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Waters, C. Kenneth"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Ereshefsky, Marc","Delehanty, Megan"],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-08-06","date_published":"2019-08-06","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:30:38Z","subjects":["Philosophy, Concepts, Ecology, Mechanism, Pathway"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/36797"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/36797","href":"http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/36797","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110703","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Waters, C. Kenneth"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Ereshefsky, Marc","Delehanty, Megan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Perkins, Timothy James"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-11"]},{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2019-08-07T14:09:09Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-08-07T14:09:09Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2019-08-06"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Calgary"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["master thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Calgary"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy, Concepts, Ecology, Mechanism, Pathway"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/36797"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110703"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The term ‘mechanism’ is ubiquitous in biology. This has caused philosophers of biology to closely examine what mechanisms are. Many characteristics of mechanisms have been generated by philosophers calling their movement the New Mechanist Philosophy, with some proponents even going as far to say that biology is fundamentally a science of mechanisms. This means that the activity of biologists is organized around the discovery, investigation, and understanding of mechanisms and offering mechanistic explanations. But other terms are also employed by scientists, like ‘pathway.’ Carl Craver, a New Mechanist, claims that ‘mechanism’ can do the work of ‘pathway’ and equates these terms (2007, 3). However, this fundamentalist approach runs afoul of the messy conceptual practices that real scientists engage in. I examine a case from ecology where ecologists are engaged in conceptual practices, employing the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘pathway’ in their explanation. What I learn from this case is that the terms are designating concepts, which are designating scientific explanations, or objects of scientific knowledge. Instead of equating these terms, I argue that for a better understanding of scientific practice, these concepts designated by terms are to be thought of as cognitive tools, aiding the scientists to achieve their aims."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Tracing Pathways and Decomposing Mechanisms in Ecology"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Waters, C. Kenneth"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Ereshefsky, Marc","Delehanty, Megan"],"dc:creator":["Perkins, Timothy James"],"dc:date":["2019-11"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-08-07T14:09:09Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-08-07T14:09:09Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-08-06"],"dc:description.abstract":["The term ‘mechanism’ is ubiquitous in biology. This has caused philosophers of biology to closely examine what mechanisms are. Many characteristics of mechanisms have been generated by philosophers calling their movement the New Mechanist Philosophy, with some proponents even going as far to say that biology is fundamentally a science of mechanisms. This means that the activity of biologists is organized around the discovery, investigation, and understanding of mechanisms and offering mechanistic explanations. But other terms are also employed by scientists, like ‘pathway.’ Carl Craver, a New Mechanist, claims that ‘mechanism’ can do the work of ‘pathway’ and equates these terms (2007, 3). However, this fundamentalist approach runs afoul of the messy conceptual practices that real scientists engage in. I examine a case from ecology where ecologists are engaged in conceptual practices, employing the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘pathway’ in their explanation. What I learn from this case is that the terms are designating concepts, which are designating scientific explanations, or objects of scientific knowledge. Instead of equating these terms, I argue that for a better understanding of scientific practice, these concepts designated by terms are to be thought of as cognitive tools, aiding the scientists to achieve their aims."],"dc:identifier.doi":["http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/36797"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110703"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Calgary"],"dc:rights":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission."],"dc:subject":["Philosophy, Concepts, Ecology, Mechanism, Pathway"],"dc:title":["Tracing Pathways and Decomposing Mechanisms in Ecology"],"dc:type":["master thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts (MA)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Calgary"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:30:38Z"}