Digital Receipts: A System to Detect the Compromise of Digital Certificates

The ease of copying digital materials creates difficulty in detecting the theft of digital certificates. Uneducated users frequently fail to protect their digital certificate keys by not encrypting them, storing them in insecure places, and using them unwisely. In addition, there is no way to prove that protocols involving certificates are completely secure. This thesis introduces a system to ameliorate these problems by detecting the compromise of digital certificates. It leverages dual logging messages sent via side channels to a trusted third party. This third party correlates these messages and automatically detects when an imposter presents a certificate based on the collected evidence.

Name thesis:degree_name

MS

Grantor dc:publisher

Brigham Young University - Provo

Author dc:creator

• Seeley, Nathaniel Allen

• authentication
• digital certificate
• X.509
• Computer Sciences

Language dc:language

English

Repository record dc:identifier

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/1108

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarsarchive.byu.edu:etd-2107