This thesis challenges the assumption that policies will \"play fair\" within trust negotiation. Policies that do not \"play fair\" contain requirements for authentication that are misleading, irrelevant, and/or incorrect, based on the current transaction context. To detect these unfair policies, trust negotiation ontologies provide the context to determine the relevancy of a given credential set for a particular negotiation. We propose a credential relevancy framework for use in trust negotiation that utilizes ontologies to process the set of all available credentials C and produce a subset of credentials C' relevant to the context of a given negotiation. This credential relevancy framework reveals the credentials inconsistent with the current negotiation and detects potentially malicious policies that request these credentials. It provides a general solution for detecting policies that do not \"play fair,\" such as those used in credential phishing attacks, malformed policies, and malicious strategies. This thesis motivates the need for a credential relevancy framework, outlines considerations for designing and implementing it (including topics that require further research), and analyzes a prototype implementation. The credential relevancy framework prototype, analyzed in this thesis, has the following two properties: first, it incurs less than 10% extra execution time compared to a baseline trust negotiation prototype (e.g., TrustBuilder); second, credential relevance determination does not compromise the desired goals of trust negotiation—transparent and automated authentication in open systems. Current trust negotiation systems integrated with a credential relevancy framework will be enabled to better defend against users that do not always \"play fair\" by incorporating a credential relevancy framework.
","abstract_html":"<p>This thesis challenges the assumption that policies will "play fair" within trust negotiation. Policies that do not "play fair" contain requirements for authentication that are misleading, irrelevant, and/or incorrect, based on the current transaction context. To detect these unfair policies, trust negotiation ontologies provide the context to determine the relevancy of a given credential set for a particular negotiation. We propose a credential relevancy framework for use in trust negotiation that utilizes ontologies to process the set of all available credentials C and produce a subset of credentials C' relevant to the context of a given negotiation. This credential relevancy framework reveals the credentials inconsistent with the current negotiation and detects potentially malicious policies that request these credentials. It provides a general solution for detecting policies that do not "play fair," such as those used in credential phishing attacks, malformed policies, and malicious strategies. This thesis motivates the need for a credential relevancy framework, outlines considerations for designing and implementing it (including topics that require further research), and analyzes a prototype implementation. The credential relevancy framework prototype, analyzed in this thesis, has the following two properties: first, it incurs less than 10% extra execution time compared to a baseline trust negotiation prototype (e.g., TrustBuilder); second, credential relevance determination does not compromise the desired goals of trust negotiation—transparent and automated authentication in open systems. Current trust negotiation systems integrated with a credential relevancy framework will be enabled to better defend against users that do not always "play fair" by incorporating a credential relevancy framework.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Leithead, Travis S."],"institution":"Brigham Young University - Provo","degree_name":"MS","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":null,"date_issued":"","date_published":null,"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:28:12Z","subjects":["trust negotiation","policies","malicious","attacks","framework","privacy","security","Computer Sciences"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/645","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Leithead, Travis S."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2005-08-29T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Brigham Young University - Provo"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MS"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["trust negotiation","policies","malicious","attacks","framework","privacy","security","Computer Sciences"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/645","https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/context/etd/article/1644/viewcontent/ETD_CISOPTR_465.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Physical and Mathematical Sciences; Computer Science"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis challenges the assumption that policies will \"play fair\" within trust negotiation. Policies that do not \"play fair\" contain requirements for authentication that are misleading, irrelevant, and/or incorrect, based on the current transaction context. To detect these unfair policies, trust negotiation ontologies provide the context to determine the relevancy of a given credential set for a particular negotiation. We propose a credential relevancy framework for use in trust negotiation that utilizes ontologies to process the set of all available credentials C and produce a subset of credentials C' relevant to the context of a given negotiation. This credential relevancy framework reveals the credentials inconsistent with the current negotiation and detects potentially malicious policies that request these credentials. It provides a general solution for detecting policies that do not \"play fair,\" such as those used in credential phishing attacks, malformed policies, and malicious strategies. This thesis motivates the need for a credential relevancy framework, outlines considerations for designing and implementing it (including topics that require further research), and analyzes a prototype implementation. The credential relevancy framework prototype, analyzed in this thesis, has the following two properties: first, it incurs less than 10% extra execution time compared to a baseline trust negotiation prototype (e.g., TrustBuilder); second, credential relevance determination does not compromise the desired goals of trust negotiation—transparent and automated authentication in open systems. Current trust negotiation systems integrated with a credential relevancy framework will be enabled to better defend against users that do not always \"play fair\" by incorporating a credential relevancy framework.
"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application:pdf"]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["Brigham Young University - Provo"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Challenging Policies That Do Not Play Fair: A Credential Relevancy Framework Using Trust Negotiation Ontologies"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Leithead, Travis S."],"dc:date":["2005-08-29T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Physical and Mathematical Sciences; Computer Science"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis challenges the assumption that policies will \"play fair\" within trust negotiation. Policies that do not \"play fair\" contain requirements for authentication that are misleading, irrelevant, and/or incorrect, based on the current transaction context. To detect these unfair policies, trust negotiation ontologies provide the context to determine the relevancy of a given credential set for a particular negotiation. We propose a credential relevancy framework for use in trust negotiation that utilizes ontologies to process the set of all available credentials C and produce a subset of credentials C' relevant to the context of a given negotiation. This credential relevancy framework reveals the credentials inconsistent with the current negotiation and detects potentially malicious policies that request these credentials. It provides a general solution for detecting policies that do not \"play fair,\" such as those used in credential phishing attacks, malformed policies, and malicious strategies. This thesis motivates the need for a credential relevancy framework, outlines considerations for designing and implementing it (including topics that require further research), and analyzes a prototype implementation. The credential relevancy framework prototype, analyzed in this thesis, has the following two properties: first, it incurs less than 10% extra execution time compared to a baseline trust negotiation prototype (e.g., TrustBuilder); second, credential relevance determination does not compromise the desired goals of trust negotiation—transparent and automated authentication in open systems. Current trust negotiation systems integrated with a credential relevancy framework will be enabled to better defend against users that do not always \"play fair\" by incorporating a credential relevancy framework.
"],"dc:format":["application:pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/645","https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/context/etd/article/1644/viewcontent/ETD_CISOPTR_465.pdf"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:publisher":["Brigham Young University - Provo"],"dc:source":["Brigham Young University - Provo"],"dc:subject":["trust negotiation","policies","malicious","attacks","framework","privacy","security","Computer Sciences"],"dc:title":["Challenging Policies That Do Not Play Fair: A Credential Relevancy Framework Using Trust Negotiation Ontologies"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["MS"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:28:12Z"}