{"id":{"repo_id":"buffalo","oai_identifier":"oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/86815"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/buffalo/oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/86815","repository":{"repo_id":"buffalo","name":"Buffalo","base_url":"https://ubir.buffalo.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Physical Layer Security in Millimeter Wave Systems: From Multi-Gigabit WLAN to Autonomous Vehicles","abstract":"Ph.D.","abstract_html":"Ph.D.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Balakrishnan, Sarankumar; 0000-0002-7574-3306"],"institution":"State University of New York at Buffalo","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Sun, Zhi","Electrical Engineering"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-02-25T23:23:03Z","date_published":"2025-02-25T23:23:03Z","updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:37Z","subjects":["electrical engineering","computer engineering","computer science"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10477/86815","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Sun, Zhi","Electrical Engineering"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Balakrishnan, Sarankumar; 0000-0002-7574-3306"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2025-02-25T23:23:03Z","2020","2020-07-20 13:09:11"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["State University of New York at Buffalo"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["electrical engineering","computer engineering","computer science"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/86815"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Ph.D.","The availability of huge bandwidth in the millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum has led to the development of high data rate wireless communication standards such as IEEE 802.11 ad/ay and 5G-NR and as well as high accuracy sensing applications such as mmWave sensing in autonomous vehicles (AVs). Hence, it is critical to investigate and enhance the security of mmWave systems. While conventional security measures operate at a higher layer of the protocol stack, physical layer security takes advantage of the uniqueness of the physical channel as well as device dependent hardware features to secure systems. In this dissertation, we look at the security of mmWave systems from a physical layer perspective. In the first part of the dissertation, we focus on the security vulnerability of mmWave wireless networks to passive eavesdropping. Contrary to the common belief that the directional signal beams used in mmWave networks provide enhanced security against eavesdropping, we show through analytical modeling and extensive experiments using commercial mmWave WLAN devices that there exists a significant possibility of eavesdropping due to the irregular beam patterns and ambient reflectors in the environment. The dissertation then focuses on defending against physical layer attacks using RF fingerprinting. We identify that the manufacturing tolerances in the antenna arrays used in mmWave devices contribute to a beam pattern that is unique to each device and to that end, a novel beam pattern based physical layer fingerprinting system for directional mmWave wireless networks is developed. Specifically, we design a system with multiple access points to take advantage of the rich spatial-temporal information of the beam pattern. We validate the reliability performance and resilience to physical layer attacks of our proposed system using extensive experiments on commercial mmWave devices. Finally, the security vulnerabilities of mmWave based sensing in AVs is studied. Autonomous vehicles rely heavily on its sensors to make safety-critical driving decisions. To investigate the end-to-end security of mmWave sensor based perception, and planning in AVs, we design several physical layer attack strategies using state-of-the-art mmWave SDR. Through field experiments with Lincoln MKZ AV, we show that such attacks could spoof the AV in to making dangerous driving decisions and impair the safety of AVs. To improve the resiliency of AVs to such attacks, we develop and validate through experiments, a physical layer challenge-response authentication scheme and an RF fingerprinting method that utilizes unique characteristics of the mmWave signal to detect spoofing attacks.","**To request an accessible version of the file(s) associated with this item, contact library@buffalo.edu. Please include the item's persistent URL [http://hdl.handle.net/. . .] in your request.**"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Physical Layer Security in Millimeter Wave Systems: From Multi-Gigabit WLAN to Autonomous Vehicles"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Sun, Zhi","Electrical Engineering"],"dc:creator":["Balakrishnan, Sarankumar; 0000-0002-7574-3306"],"dc:date":["2025-02-25T23:23:03Z","2020","2020-07-20 13:09:11"],"dc:description":["Ph.D.","The availability of huge bandwidth in the millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum has led to the development of high data rate wireless communication standards such as IEEE 802.11 ad/ay and 5G-NR and as well as high accuracy sensing applications such as mmWave sensing in autonomous vehicles (AVs). Hence, it is critical to investigate and enhance the security of mmWave systems. While conventional security measures operate at a higher layer of the protocol stack, physical layer security takes advantage of the uniqueness of the physical channel as well as device dependent hardware features to secure systems. In this dissertation, we look at the security of mmWave systems from a physical layer perspective. In the first part of the dissertation, we focus on the security vulnerability of mmWave wireless networks to passive eavesdropping. Contrary to the common belief that the directional signal beams used in mmWave networks provide enhanced security against eavesdropping, we show through analytical modeling and extensive experiments using commercial mmWave WLAN devices that there exists a significant possibility of eavesdropping due to the irregular beam patterns and ambient reflectors in the environment. The dissertation then focuses on defending against physical layer attacks using RF fingerprinting. We identify that the manufacturing tolerances in the antenna arrays used in mmWave devices contribute to a beam pattern that is unique to each device and to that end, a novel beam pattern based physical layer fingerprinting system for directional mmWave wireless networks is developed. Specifically, we design a system with multiple access points to take advantage of the rich spatial-temporal information of the beam pattern. We validate the reliability performance and resilience to physical layer attacks of our proposed system using extensive experiments on commercial mmWave devices. Finally, the security vulnerabilities of mmWave based sensing in AVs is studied. Autonomous vehicles rely heavily on its sensors to make safety-critical driving decisions. To investigate the end-to-end security of mmWave sensor based perception, and planning in AVs, we design several physical layer attack strategies using state-of-the-art mmWave SDR. Through field experiments with Lincoln MKZ AV, we show that such attacks could spoof the AV in to making dangerous driving decisions and impair the safety of AVs. To improve the resiliency of AVs to such attacks, we develop and validate through experiments, a physical layer challenge-response authentication scheme and an RF fingerprinting method that utilizes unique characteristics of the mmWave signal to detect spoofing attacks.","**To request an accessible version of the file(s) associated with this item, contact library@buffalo.edu. Please include the item's persistent URL [http://hdl.handle.net/. . .] in your request.**"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/86815"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["State University of New York at Buffalo"],"dc:rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"dc:subject":["electrical engineering","computer engineering","computer science"],"dc:title":["Physical Layer Security in Millimeter Wave Systems: From Multi-Gigabit WLAN to Autonomous Vehicles"],"dc:type":["Text","Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:37Z"}