{"id":{"repo_id":"buffalo","oai_identifier":"oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/80895"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/buffalo/oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/80895","repository":{"repo_id":"buffalo","name":"Buffalo","base_url":"https://ubir.buffalo.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: Growth and Welfare Implications","abstract":"Ph.D.","abstract_html":"Ph.D.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dasgupta, Madhura; 0000-0003-1921-9910"],"institution":"State University of New York at Buffalo","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Rao, Neel","Economics"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-10-29T16:47:56Z","date_published":"2019-10-29T16:47:56Z","updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:25Z","subjects":["economics"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10477/80895","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Rao, Neel","Economics"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dasgupta, Madhura; 0000-0003-1921-9910"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-10-29T16:47:56Z","2019","2019-08-06 01:20:55"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["State University of New York at Buffalo"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["economics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/80895"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Ph.D.","My thesis includes three chapters all of which focus on analyzing the micro and the macroeconomic consequences of private participation in providing public goods/infrastructure. The first chapter provides both theoretical and empirical analyses of private participation in the provision of public goods. A model of incomplete contracting between the government and the private sector is used to analyze how the importance of private investment and the allocation of ownership rights affect the degree of economic inefficiency. The empirical analysis uses panel data on 136 developing countries over the period 1990-2016. The impact of private participation through public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements on economic output and growth across different sectors of the economy is studied. This enables identification of the types of PPP arrangements in each sector that are most strongly associated with growth. The results suggest that for goods with a greater degree of impurity or projects with a higher technological content, engaging the private sec- tor in public good provision results in a better economic performance. But the results also indicate the existence of an ambiguity regarding how the allocation of private ownership rights over an asset affects economic performance, for different degrees of impurity of the public good.The second chapter examines asset recycling in an economy where the government auctions to competing firms, the private ownership of a fraction of a stock of infrastructure to raise revenue, which is to be used to improve welfare in the economy. The government needs to choose an optimal fraction of infrastructure to auction in order to maximize welfare. A small fraction may result in low firm bids and a low expected revenue from the auction, but it leaves a larger fraction of the infrastructure available to firms as a purely public input that lowers firms’ cost of producing a consumption good and increases their profits. On the other hand, auctioning a large fraction may raise the firms’ bids and increase the expected auction revenue, but it also privatizes a large part of the previously free infrastructure input, thus raising production costs, reducing production of the consumption good and raising its market price. Within the above context, this research examines and explains the determinants of a social welfare maximizing policy of asset recycling.Finally, the third chapter focuses on analyzing the choice between public and private provision of public goods in the presence of congestion and corruption in the context of a macroeconomic endogenous growth model. The results state that though public provision growth rates are higher than that in the private provision regime, under the assumption of no leakages in government spending or for very low levels of corruption, the case for private provision becomes stronger for higher corruption leakages. Corruption leakages directly affect the productivity of the technology creating the good in the public provision regime. As a result, public provision growth rates are more sensitive to higher corruption leakages."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: Growth and Welfare Implications"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Rao, Neel","Economics"],"dc:creator":["Dasgupta, Madhura; 0000-0003-1921-9910"],"dc:date":["2019-10-29T16:47:56Z","2019","2019-08-06 01:20:55"],"dc:description":["Ph.D.","My thesis includes three chapters all of which focus on analyzing the micro and the macroeconomic consequences of private participation in providing public goods/infrastructure. The first chapter provides both theoretical and empirical analyses of private participation in the provision of public goods. A model of incomplete contracting between the government and the private sector is used to analyze how the importance of private investment and the allocation of ownership rights affect the degree of economic inefficiency. The empirical analysis uses panel data on 136 developing countries over the period 1990-2016. The impact of private participation through public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements on economic output and growth across different sectors of the economy is studied. This enables identification of the types of PPP arrangements in each sector that are most strongly associated with growth. The results suggest that for goods with a greater degree of impurity or projects with a higher technological content, engaging the private sec- tor in public good provision results in a better economic performance. But the results also indicate the existence of an ambiguity regarding how the allocation of private ownership rights over an asset affects economic performance, for different degrees of impurity of the public good.The second chapter examines asset recycling in an economy where the government auctions to competing firms, the private ownership of a fraction of a stock of infrastructure to raise revenue, which is to be used to improve welfare in the economy. The government needs to choose an optimal fraction of infrastructure to auction in order to maximize welfare. A small fraction may result in low firm bids and a low expected revenue from the auction, but it leaves a larger fraction of the infrastructure available to firms as a purely public input that lowers firms’ cost of producing a consumption good and increases their profits. On the other hand, auctioning a large fraction may raise the firms’ bids and increase the expected auction revenue, but it also privatizes a large part of the previously free infrastructure input, thus raising production costs, reducing production of the consumption good and raising its market price. Within the above context, this research examines and explains the determinants of a social welfare maximizing policy of asset recycling.Finally, the third chapter focuses on analyzing the choice between public and private provision of public goods in the presence of congestion and corruption in the context of a macroeconomic endogenous growth model. The results state that though public provision growth rates are higher than that in the private provision regime, under the assumption of no leakages in government spending or for very low levels of corruption, the case for private provision becomes stronger for higher corruption leakages. Corruption leakages directly affect the productivity of the technology creating the good in the public provision regime. As a result, public provision growth rates are more sensitive to higher corruption leakages."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/80895"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["State University of New York at Buffalo"],"dc:rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"dc:subject":["economics"],"dc:title":["Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: Growth and Welfare Implications"],"dc:type":["Text","Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:25Z"}