{"id":{"repo_id":"buffalo","oai_identifier":"oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/80884"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/buffalo/oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/80884","repository":{"repo_id":"buffalo","name":"Buffalo","base_url":"https://ubir.buffalo.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Investigating the Adjustment Speeds of the Actual Towards the Desired Chief Executive Officer Pay and Firm Performance: Three Partial Adjustment and Partial Adjustment Valuation Approaches","abstract":"Ph.D.","abstract_html":"Ph.D.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Shi, Juehui; 0000-0002-1913-3706"],"institution":"State University of New York at Buffalo","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Lin, Winston","Operations Management and Strategy"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-10-29T16:47:51Z","date_published":"2019-10-29T16:47:51Z","updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:25Z","subjects":["management","economics","business administration"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10477/80884","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Lin, Winston","Operations Management and Strategy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Shi, Juehui; 0000-0002-1913-3706"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-10-29T16:47:51Z","2019","2019-08-02 16:22:37"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["State University of New York at Buffalo"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["management","economics","business administration"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/80884"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Ph.D.","There is an ongoing debate on whether or not chief executive officers (CEOs) are paid for firm performance and whether CEOs are overpaid. Kaplan (2008) argues that CEO pay is in fact strongly tied to firm performance. However, Tosi et al. (2000) find that return on equity (short term), changes in the financial performance, and return on asset only explain 4.5%, 4.1%, and 1.4% of the variance in CEO pay respectively. The inconsistent findings on the relationship between firm performance and CEO pay could be caused by the inadequate (controversial or arbitrary) choice of the performance measure. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that CEOs are able to inflate performance by manipulating the discretionary parts of the reported earnings. Murphy (2012) discovers that using the accounting-based ratios alone for bonus pay (e.g., earnings per share, return on equity, and return on capital) can diverge CEO’s incentive from improving firm value to manipulating self-pay. In this dissertation, we propose analyzing the CEO compensation and the firm performance using three new and novel partial adjustment (PA) and partial adjustment valuation (PAV) approaches...Our contribution to the present and future corporate governance and executive compensation research is threefold. First, using three novel PA and PAV approaches, we test two competing theories regarding the relationship between firm performance and CEO pay, the agency (or optimal contracting) theory versus the managerial entrenchment (or rent extraction) theory. Second, derived from the PA and PAV approaches, we provide a more robust measure (e.g., the average performance ratio or APR) to evaluating if CEOs are overpaid, underpaid, or paid optimally. Third, the proposed three PA and PAV approaches along with the empirical results significantly advance our understanding of the current CEO compensation theories and offer vital insights for future executive compensation studies."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Investigating the Adjustment Speeds of the Actual Towards the Desired Chief Executive Officer Pay and Firm Performance: Three Partial Adjustment and Partial Adjustment Valuation Approaches"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Lin, Winston","Operations Management and Strategy"],"dc:creator":["Shi, Juehui; 0000-0002-1913-3706"],"dc:date":["2019-10-29T16:47:51Z","2019","2019-08-02 16:22:37"],"dc:description":["Ph.D.","There is an ongoing debate on whether or not chief executive officers (CEOs) are paid for firm performance and whether CEOs are overpaid. Kaplan (2008) argues that CEO pay is in fact strongly tied to firm performance. However, Tosi et al. (2000) find that return on equity (short term), changes in the financial performance, and return on asset only explain 4.5%, 4.1%, and 1.4% of the variance in CEO pay respectively. The inconsistent findings on the relationship between firm performance and CEO pay could be caused by the inadequate (controversial or arbitrary) choice of the performance measure. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that CEOs are able to inflate performance by manipulating the discretionary parts of the reported earnings. Murphy (2012) discovers that using the accounting-based ratios alone for bonus pay (e.g., earnings per share, return on equity, and return on capital) can diverge CEO’s incentive from improving firm value to manipulating self-pay. In this dissertation, we propose analyzing the CEO compensation and the firm performance using three new and novel partial adjustment (PA) and partial adjustment valuation (PAV) approaches...Our contribution to the present and future corporate governance and executive compensation research is threefold. First, using three novel PA and PAV approaches, we test two competing theories regarding the relationship between firm performance and CEO pay, the agency (or optimal contracting) theory versus the managerial entrenchment (or rent extraction) theory. Second, derived from the PA and PAV approaches, we provide a more robust measure (e.g., the average performance ratio or APR) to evaluating if CEOs are overpaid, underpaid, or paid optimally. Third, the proposed three PA and PAV approaches along with the empirical results significantly advance our understanding of the current CEO compensation theories and offer vital insights for future executive compensation studies."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/80884"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["State University of New York at Buffalo"],"dc:rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"dc:subject":["management","economics","business administration"],"dc:title":["Investigating the Adjustment Speeds of the Actual Towards the Desired Chief Executive Officer Pay and Firm Performance: Three Partial Adjustment and Partial Adjustment Valuation Approaches"],"dc:type":["Text","Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:25Z"}