{"id":{"repo_id":"buffalo","oai_identifier":"oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/79930"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/buffalo/oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/79930","repository":{"repo_id":"buffalo","name":"Buffalo","base_url":"https://ubir.buffalo.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Pol in the Family: The Effects of Dynasties in Congressional Elections and Representation","abstract":"Ph.D.","abstract_html":"Ph.D.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Stout, Kevin"],"institution":"State University of New York at Buffalo","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Battista, James","Political Science"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-07-30T15:11:12Z","date_published":"2019-07-30T15:11:12Z","updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:21Z","subjects":["political science"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10477/79930","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Battista, James","Political Science"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Stout, Kevin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-07-30T15:11:12Z","2019","2019-05-13 16:56:47"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["State University of New York at Buffalo"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["political science"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/79930"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Ph.D.","In order to assess the electoral performance of candidates from political dynasties, I used web scraping to collect information about American political families. Using this data, I find that dynastic candidates have an electoral advantage in U.S. Congressional elections from 1944 to 2016. The advantage is largest for dynastic challengers in open seat races. I next consider explanations for the electoral advantage and code various characteristics for each dynastic candidate. I find that dynastic candidates who share name attachment to the dynasty have a higher vote percentage than those dynastic candidates who do not. Additionally, dynastic candidates overall spend more money and challenge weaker incumbents than non-dynastic candidates. In terms of representation, I use NOMINATE scores and Random Forests to show that dynastic members are not significantly better or worse at fitting the ideological expectations of their districts. Dynastic House members are in the most liberal section of their parties. Ideological homogeneity within dynasties is driven by partisanship and geography more than other characteristics. Overall, the results show dynastic candidates, especially challengers, have an advantage in elections. The advantage can be explained by name attachment, financial resources, and strategic decision-making. Despite these advantages, dynastic members are mostly indistinguishable from non-dynastic members in terms of ideology.","**To request an accessible version of the file(s) associated with this item, contact library@buffalo.edu. Please include the item's persistent URL [http://hdl.handle.net/. . .] in your request.**"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Pol in the Family: The Effects of Dynasties in Congressional Elections and Representation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Battista, James","Political Science"],"dc:creator":["Stout, Kevin"],"dc:date":["2019-07-30T15:11:12Z","2019","2019-05-13 16:56:47"],"dc:description":["Ph.D.","In order to assess the electoral performance of candidates from political dynasties, I used web scraping to collect information about American political families. Using this data, I find that dynastic candidates have an electoral advantage in U.S. Congressional elections from 1944 to 2016. The advantage is largest for dynastic challengers in open seat races. I next consider explanations for the electoral advantage and code various characteristics for each dynastic candidate. I find that dynastic candidates who share name attachment to the dynasty have a higher vote percentage than those dynastic candidates who do not. Additionally, dynastic candidates overall spend more money and challenge weaker incumbents than non-dynastic candidates. In terms of representation, I use NOMINATE scores and Random Forests to show that dynastic members are not significantly better or worse at fitting the ideological expectations of their districts. Dynastic House members are in the most liberal section of their parties. Ideological homogeneity within dynasties is driven by partisanship and geography more than other characteristics. Overall, the results show dynastic candidates, especially challengers, have an advantage in elections. The advantage can be explained by name attachment, financial resources, and strategic decision-making. Despite these advantages, dynastic members are mostly indistinguishable from non-dynastic members in terms of ideology.","**To request an accessible version of the file(s) associated with this item, contact library@buffalo.edu. Please include the item's persistent URL [http://hdl.handle.net/. . .] in your request.**"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/79930"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["State University of New York at Buffalo"],"dc:rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"dc:subject":["political science"],"dc:title":["Pol in the Family: The Effects of Dynasties in Congressional Elections and Representation"],"dc:type":["Text","Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:21Z"}