{"id":{"repo_id":"buffalo","oai_identifier":"oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/79886"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/buffalo/oai:ubir.buffalo.edu:10477/79886","repository":{"repo_id":"buffalo","name":"Buffalo","base_url":"https://ubir.buffalo.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Equity Risk Incentives and Voluntary Disclosure","abstract":"Ph.D.","abstract_html":"Ph.D.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Wang, Mengmeng"],"institution":"State University of New York at Buffalo","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Suk, Inho","Accounting and Law"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-07-30T15:10:46Z","date_published":"2019-07-30T15:10:46Z","updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:19Z","subjects":["accounting"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10477/79886","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Suk, Inho","Accounting and Law"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Wang, Mengmeng"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-07-30T15:10:46Z","2019","2019-05-03 12:05:02"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["State University of New York at Buffalo"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["accounting"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/79886"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Ph.D.","This study examines whether equity risk incentives (i.e., vega) prompt managers to issue stock return volatility-increasing management earnings forecasts. First, I find that stock return volatility increases more (or decreases less) following a management earnings forecast as a firm’s CEO vega is higher. Further, firms issue volatility-increasing management earnings forecasts more frequently as their CEO vega is higher. Additional analyses, including a path analysis, reveal that firms with high CEO vega are more likely to issue sporadic, bad-news, range or open-ended, and short-horizon management earnings forecasts which indirectly increase stock volatility. Finally, I show that CEOs are more likely to sell their stock options following the issuance of stock volatility-increasing management earnings forecasts. Taken together, my findings suggest that although managers’ equity risk incentives drive them to issue more earnings forecasts, these forecasts are less likely to increase firm transparency but rather tend to increase stock return volatility.","**To request an accessible version of the file(s) associated with this item, contact library@buffalo.edu. Please include the item's persistent URL [http://hdl.handle.net/. . .] in your request.**"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Equity Risk Incentives and Voluntary Disclosure"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Suk, Inho","Accounting and Law"],"dc:creator":["Wang, Mengmeng"],"dc:date":["2019-07-30T15:10:46Z","2019","2019-05-03 12:05:02"],"dc:description":["Ph.D.","This study examines whether equity risk incentives (i.e., vega) prompt managers to issue stock return volatility-increasing management earnings forecasts. First, I find that stock return volatility increases more (or decreases less) following a management earnings forecast as a firm’s CEO vega is higher. Further, firms issue volatility-increasing management earnings forecasts more frequently as their CEO vega is higher. Additional analyses, including a path analysis, reveal that firms with high CEO vega are more likely to issue sporadic, bad-news, range or open-ended, and short-horizon management earnings forecasts which indirectly increase stock volatility. Finally, I show that CEOs are more likely to sell their stock options following the issuance of stock volatility-increasing management earnings forecasts. Taken together, my findings suggest that although managers’ equity risk incentives drive them to issue more earnings forecasts, these forecasts are less likely to increase firm transparency but rather tend to increase stock return volatility.","**To request an accessible version of the file(s) associated with this item, contact library@buffalo.edu. Please include the item's persistent URL [http://hdl.handle.net/. . .] in your request.**"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/10477/79886"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["State University of New York at Buffalo"],"dc:rights":["Users of works found in University at Buffalo Institutional Repository (UBIR) are responsible for identifying and contacting the copyright owner for permission to reuse. University at Buffalo Libraries do not manage rights for copyright-protected works and cannot assist with permissions.","Copyright retained by author."],"dc:subject":["accounting"],"dc:title":["Equity Risk Incentives and Voluntary Disclosure"],"dc:type":["Text","Dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T19:05:19Z"}