{"id":{"repo_id":"brock","oai_identifier":"oai:brocku.scholaris.ca:10464/6368"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/brock/oai:brocku.scholaris.ca:10464/6368","repository":{"repo_id":"brock","name":"Brock University","base_url":"https://brocku.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Effect of executive compensation on firm performance","abstract":"The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.","abstract_html":"The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Abedin, Mohammad Yameenul"],"institution":"Brock University","degree_name":"M.Sc. Management","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Faculty of Business","degree_department":"Faculty of Business Programs","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-05-04T15:46:43Z","date_published":"2015-05-04T15:46:43Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:23:16Z","subjects":["CEO compensation","pay-for-performance","Fama-French 3-factor model","risk taking","pay-volatility sensitivity"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10464/6368","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Faculty of Business Programs"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Abedin, Mohammad Yameenul"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2015-05-04T15:46:43Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2015-05-04T15:46:43Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2015-05-04T15:46:43Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Electronic Thesis or Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Faculty of Business"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.Sc. 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Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Effect of executive compensation on firm performance"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.department":["Faculty of Business Programs"],"dc:creator":["Abedin, Mohammad Yameenul"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2015-05-04T15:46:43Z"],"dc:date.available":["2015-05-04T15:46:43Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2015-05-04T15:46:43Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10464/6368"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:subject":["CEO compensation","pay-for-performance","Fama-French 3-factor model","risk taking","pay-volatility sensitivity"],"dc:title":["Effect of executive compensation on firm performance"],"dc:type":["Electronic Thesis or Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Faculty of Business"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.Sc. Management"],"thesis:institution_name":["Brock University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:23:16Z"}