{"id":{"repo_id":"brock","oai_identifier":"oai:brocku.scholaris.ca:10464/4375"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/brock/oai:brocku.scholaris.ca:10464/4375","repository":{"repo_id":"brock","name":"Brock University","base_url":"https://brocku.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation","abstract":"This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation","abstract_html":"This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Jafri, Syed Rahat Ali"],"institution":"Brock University","degree_name":"M.Sc. Management","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Faculty of Business","degree_department":"Faculty of Business Programs","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-05-14","date_published":"2013-05-14","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:23:18Z","subjects":["Risk Taking","Excess Compensation","CEO risk taking","CEO excess compensation","Executive compensation"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10464/4375","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Faculty of Business Programs"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jafri, Syed Rahat Ali"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2013-05-14T20:05:34Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2013-05-14T20:05:34Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013-05-14"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Electronic Thesis or Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Faculty of Business"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.Sc. 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Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. 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When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10464/4375"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Risk Taking","Excess Compensation","CEO risk taking","CEO excess compensation","Executive compensation"],"dc:title":["Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation"],"dc:type":["Electronic Thesis or Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Faculty of Business"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.Sc. 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