Essays on cartels stability under antitrust policies
This thesis is composed of three essays about cartels’ stability under antitrust policies. The ﬁrst essay aims to create a new approach to analyze optimal antitrust policies to combat cartels in a more general context. Using the repeated games theory we build a scenario where a cartel — any collusive strategy can be considered — operates under an economy with antitrust policies. We show that antitrust policies — antitrust enforcement without leniency program, ex-ante leniency program, and ex-post leniency program — negatively aﬀect cartels’ stability. However, there are no optimal antitrust enforcement parameters without a leniency program to destabilize cartels. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that total immunity of the whistle-blower cartel member is more eﬀective than partial immunity in destabilizing cartels. The second essay aims to answer the question: is antitrust enforcement more eﬀective against cartels when products are horizontally more homogeneous or diﬀerentiated? Based on Cournot’s (Bertrand ’s) horizontally diﬀerentiated duopoly model, we conclude that antitrust enforcement is more eﬀective on cartel stability when products are highly diﬀerentiated. However, it should be noted that antitrust enforcement negatively aﬀects cartel stability — regardless of the degree of diﬀerentiation. The third essay aims to answer: is antitrust enforcement more eﬀective against cartels when products are vertically more homogeneous or diﬀerentiated? Based on Bertrand’s vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly model, we show that antitrust enforcement uniformly and negatively aﬀects cartel stability, for every product quality diﬀerentiation degree — antitrust enforcement does not strongly aﬀect the stability of a cartel that has a speciﬁc product quality diﬀerentiation degree. Keywords: Market Structure. Collusion Economics. Antitrust Policies.
Organização industrial (Teoria econômica), Cartéis, Direito antitruste
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