{"id":{"repo_id":"brazil-ufv","oai_identifier":"oai:locus.ufv.br:123456789/30703"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/brazil-ufv/oai:locus.ufv.br:123456789/30703","repository":{"repo_id":"brazil-ufv","name":"Brazil UFV","base_url":"https://locus.ufv.br/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Essays on cartels stability under antitrust policies","abstract":"This thesis is composed of three essays about cartels’ stability under antitrust policies. The first essay aims to create a new approach to analyze optimal antitrust policies to combat cartels in a more general context. Using the repeated games theory we build a scenario where a cartel — any collusive strategy can be considered — operates under an economy with antitrust policies. We show that antitrust policies — antitrust enforcement without leniency program, ex-ante leniency program, and ex-post leniency program — negatively affect cartels’ stability. However, there are no optimal antitrust enforcement parameters without a leniency program to destabilize cartels. On the other hand, we find that total immunity of the whistle-blower cartel member is more effective than partial immunity in destabilizing cartels. The second essay aims to answer the question: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are horizontally more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Cournot’s (Bertrand ’s) horizontally differentiated duopoly model, we conclude that antitrust enforcement is more effective on cartel stability when products are highly differentiated. However, it should be noted that antitrust enforcement negatively affects cartel stability — regardless of the degree of differentiation. The third essay aims to answer: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are vertically more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Bertrand’s vertically differentiated duopoly model, we show that antitrust enforcement uniformly and negatively affects cartel stability, for every product quality differentiation degree — antitrust enforcement does not strongly affect the stability of a cartel that has a specific product quality differentiation degree. Keywords: Market Structure. Collusion Economics. Antitrust Policies.","abstract_html":"This thesis is composed of three essays about cartels’ stability under antitrust policies. The first essay aims to create a new approach to analyze optimal antitrust policies to combat cartels in a more general context. Using the repeated games theory we build a scenario where a cartel — any collusive strategy can be considered — operates under an economy with antitrust policies. We show that antitrust policies — antitrust enforcement without leniency program, ex-ante leniency program, and ex-post leniency program — negatively affect cartels’ stability. However, there are no optimal antitrust enforcement parameters without a leniency program to destabilize cartels. On the other hand, we find that total immunity of the whistle-blower cartel member is more effective than partial immunity in destabilizing cartels. The second essay aims to answer the question: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are horizontally more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Cournot’s (Bertrand ’s) horizontally differentiated duopoly model, we conclude that antitrust enforcement is more effective on cartel stability when products are highly differentiated. However, it should be noted that antitrust enforcement negatively affects cartel stability — regardless of the degree of differentiation. The third essay aims to answer: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are vertically more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Bertrand’s vertically differentiated duopoly model, we show that antitrust enforcement uniformly and negatively affects cartel stability, for every product quality differentiation degree — antitrust enforcement does not strongly affect the stability of a cartel that has a specific product quality differentiation degree. Keywords: Market Structure. Collusion Economics. Antitrust Policies.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Huamani Quispe, Williams Ubaldo"],"institution":"Universidade Federal de Viçosa","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Pinha, Lucas Campio"],"advisors":["Braga, Marcelo José"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-03-28","date_published":"2022-03-28","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:21:00Z","subjects":["Organização industrial (Teoria econômica)","Cartéis","Direito antitruste"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Acesso Aberto"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.47328/ufvbbt.2022.271"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.47328/ufvbbt.2022.271","href":"https://doi.org/10.47328/ufvbbt.2022.271","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://locus.ufv.br//handle/123456789/30703","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Pinha, Lucas Campio"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Braga, Marcelo José"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Huamani Quispe, Williams Ubaldo"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2023-04-13T12:50:30Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-04-13T12:50:30Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2022-03-28"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Universidade Federal de Viçosa"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Tese"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Organização industrial (Teoria econômica)","Cartéis","Direito antitruste"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Acesso Aberto"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.47328/ufvbbt.2022.271"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://locus.ufv.br//handle/123456789/30703"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis is composed of three essays about cartels’ stability under antitrust policies. The first essay aims to create a new approach to analyze optimal antitrust policies to combat cartels in a more general context. Using the repeated games theory we build a scenario where a cartel — any collusive strategy can be considered — operates under an economy with antitrust policies. We show that antitrust policies — antitrust enforcement without leniency program, ex-ante leniency program, and ex-post leniency program — negatively affect cartels’ stability. However, there are no optimal antitrust enforcement parameters without a leniency program to destabilize cartels. On the other hand, we find that total immunity of the whistle-blower cartel member is more effective than partial immunity in destabilizing cartels. The second essay aims to answer the question: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are horizontally more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Cournot’s (Bertrand ’s) horizontally differentiated duopoly model, we conclude that antitrust enforcement is more effective on cartel stability when products are highly differentiated. However, it should be noted that antitrust enforcement negatively affects cartel stability — regardless of the degree of differentiation. The third essay aims to answer: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are vertically more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Bertrand’s vertically differentiated duopoly model, we show that antitrust enforcement uniformly and negatively affects cartel stability, for every product quality differentiation degree — antitrust enforcement does not strongly affect the stability of a cartel that has a specific product quality differentiation degree. Keywords: Market Structure. Collusion Economics. Antitrust Policies.","Esta tese é composta por três ensaios sobre a estabilidade dos cartéis diante das políticas antitruste. O primeiro ensaio visa criar uma nova abordagem para analisar políticas antitruste ótimas para combater cartéis em um contexto mais geral. Usando a teoria dos jogos repetidos, construímos um cenário onde um cartel – qualquer estratégia de conluio pode ser considerada – opera sob uma economia com políticas antitruste. Mostra-se que as políticas antitruste — antitrust enforcement sem programa de leniência, programa de leniência ex-ante, e programa de leniência ex-post — afetam negativamente a estabilidade dos cartéis. No entanto, não há parâmetros ótimos de antitrust enforcement sem um programa de leniência para desestabilizar os cartéis. Por outro lado, verificamos que a imunidade total do denunciante membro do cartel é mais eficaz do que a imunidade parcial na desestabilização de cartéis. O segundo ensaio visa responder à pergunta: o antitrust enforcement é mais eficaz contra cartéis quando os produtos são horizontalmente mais homogêneos ou diferenciados? Com base no modelo de duopólio horizontalmente diferenciado de Cournot (Bertrand), concluímos que o antitrust enforcement é mais eficaz desestabilizando carteis quando os produtos são altamente diferenciados. No entanto, deve-se notar que o antitrust enforcement afeta negativamente a estabilidade do cartel — independentemente do grau de diferenciação. O terceiro ensaio visa responder: o antitrust enforcement é mais eficaz contra cartéis quando os produtos são verticalmente mais homogêneos ou diferenciados? Com base no modelo de duopólio verticalmente diferenciado de Bertrand, mostra-se que o antitrust enforcement afeta de maneira uniforme e negativa a estabilidade do cartel, para cada grau de diferenciação da qualidade do produto – o antitrust enforcement não afeta fortemente a estabilidade de um cartel que possui um grau específico de diferenciação de qualidade do produto. Palavras-chave: Estrutura de Mercados. Economia do Conluio. Políticas Antitruste."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on cartels stability under antitrust policies"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Pinha, Lucas Campio"],"dc:contributor.advisor":["Braga, Marcelo José"],"dc:creator":["Huamani Quispe, Williams Ubaldo"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2023-04-13T12:50:30Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-04-13T12:50:30Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2022-03-28"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis is composed of three essays about cartels’ stability under antitrust policies. The first essay aims to create a new approach to analyze optimal antitrust policies to combat cartels in a more general context. Using the repeated games theory we build a scenario where a cartel — any collusive strategy can be considered — operates under an economy with antitrust policies. We show that antitrust policies — antitrust enforcement without leniency program, ex-ante leniency program, and ex-post leniency program — negatively affect cartels’ stability. However, there are no optimal antitrust enforcement parameters without a leniency program to destabilize cartels. On the other hand, we find that total immunity of the whistle-blower cartel member is more effective than partial immunity in destabilizing cartels. The second essay aims to answer the question: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are horizontally more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Cournot’s (Bertrand ’s) horizontally differentiated duopoly model, we conclude that antitrust enforcement is more effective on cartel stability when products are highly differentiated. However, it should be noted that antitrust enforcement negatively affects cartel stability — regardless of the degree of differentiation. The third essay aims to answer: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are vertically more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Bertrand’s vertically differentiated duopoly model, we show that antitrust enforcement uniformly and negatively affects cartel stability, for every product quality differentiation degree — antitrust enforcement does not strongly affect the stability of a cartel that has a specific product quality differentiation degree. Keywords: Market Structure. Collusion Economics. Antitrust Policies.","Esta tese é composta por três ensaios sobre a estabilidade dos cartéis diante das políticas antitruste. O primeiro ensaio visa criar uma nova abordagem para analisar políticas antitruste ótimas para combater cartéis em um contexto mais geral. Usando a teoria dos jogos repetidos, construímos um cenário onde um cartel – qualquer estratégia de conluio pode ser considerada – opera sob uma economia com políticas antitruste. Mostra-se que as políticas antitruste — antitrust enforcement sem programa de leniência, programa de leniência ex-ante, e programa de leniência ex-post — afetam negativamente a estabilidade dos cartéis. No entanto, não há parâmetros ótimos de antitrust enforcement sem um programa de leniência para desestabilizar os cartéis. Por outro lado, verificamos que a imunidade total do denunciante membro do cartel é mais eficaz do que a imunidade parcial na desestabilização de cartéis. O segundo ensaio visa responder à pergunta: o antitrust enforcement é mais eficaz contra cartéis quando os produtos são horizontalmente mais homogêneos ou diferenciados? Com base no modelo de duopólio horizontalmente diferenciado de Cournot (Bertrand), concluímos que o antitrust enforcement é mais eficaz desestabilizando carteis quando os produtos são altamente diferenciados. No entanto, deve-se notar que o antitrust enforcement afeta negativamente a estabilidade do cartel — independentemente do grau de diferenciação. O terceiro ensaio visa responder: o antitrust enforcement é mais eficaz contra cartéis quando os produtos são verticalmente mais homogêneos ou diferenciados? Com base no modelo de duopólio verticalmente diferenciado de Bertrand, mostra-se que o antitrust enforcement afeta de maneira uniforme e negativa a estabilidade do cartel, para cada grau de diferenciação da qualidade do produto – o antitrust enforcement não afeta fortemente a estabilidade de um cartel que possui um grau específico de diferenciação de qualidade do produto. Palavras-chave: Estrutura de Mercados. Economia do Conluio. Políticas Antitruste."],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.47328/ufvbbt.2022.271"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://locus.ufv.br//handle/123456789/30703"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Universidade Federal de Viçosa"],"dc:rights":["Acesso Aberto"],"dc:subject":["Organização industrial (Teoria econômica)","Cartéis","Direito antitruste"],"dc:title":["Essays on cartels stability under antitrust policies"],"dc:type":["Tese"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:21:00Z"}