{"id":{"repo_id":"bradford","oai_identifier":"oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/19695"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/bradford/oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/19695","repository":{"repo_id":"bradford","name":"University of Bradford","base_url":"https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"What were the effects of the post-colonial experience of counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented?","abstract":"This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army’s ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq. Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army’s ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed. The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq. If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts?","abstract_html":"This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army’s ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq. Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army’s ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed. The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq. If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts?","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bulleyment, Neil D."],"institution":"University of Bradford","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Harris, David","Pankhurst, Donna T."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021","date_published":"2021","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:15:08Z","subjects":["British army","Counterinsurgency","Post-Colonial","Effects","Lessons","Iraq","Northern Ireland","Oman"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["\"Creative
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