L'anno che non fu? L'anno dell'Europa e la crisi nelle relazioni transatlantiche, 1973/74
The 1970s are in the limelight of a growing historiographic attention, partly due to the recent opening of new archival resources. 1973, in particular, has a special interest in the historian’s eyes, as many are the events that happened that year: to name but a few, the Chilean coup, the October War, the ensuing oil crisis, the Vietnamese peace treaty. So it is may be not entirely surprising that not much attention has been paid to the Year of Europe, a nebulous American initiative destined to sum up to nothing practical - as Kissinger himself put it, it was destined to be the Year that never Was.1 It is my opinion, however, that its failure should not conceal its historical interest. Even though transatlantic relations have sometimes been seen as an uninterrupted history of crisis,2 in 1973 they reached what could then be considered as their unprecedented nadir. I believe that a thorough analysis of the events that during that year found the US increasingly at odds with the countries of Western Europe is worth carrying out not only to cast a new light on the dynamics of transatlantic relations but also to deepen our comprehension of the internal dynamics of the actors involved, mainly the Nixon administration and a unifying Europe. The Nixon administration had not carefully planned what the initiative actually should have amounted to, and its official announcement appears to have been one of Kissinger’s coups de theatre. Yet the Year of Europe responded to the vital priority of revitalising the relations with Western Europe, crucial ally, for too long neglected. But 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had sought. On the contrary, it saw, for the first time, the countries of the newly enlarged EC engaged in a real, if short-lived, solidarity on foreign policy, which highlighted the Nixon administration’s contradictions regarding European integration. Those, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehensions and misperceptions, which the unexpected deflagration of the October war seriously worsened. However, even though the tensions did not disappear, the European front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil crisis. Significant changes in the leadership of the main European countries helped to get the tones back to normal. During the course of 1974-5, the substantial failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Gymlich compromise, frequent and serene bilateral meetings bear witness that the worst was over.
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna