{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:811"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:811","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"The incompatibility between free will theodicies and religious experience","abstract":"This thesis suggests a novel problem for theists. This problem is that there is an incompatibility between free will theodicies and religious experience. Free will theodicies are responses to the problem of evil and religious experience is form of interaction between God and people. The free will theodicies that are discussed say that God gives us free will for two purposes. These purposes are to excuse God from direct responsibility for evil in the world and to act as a qualifying factor in who goes where when we die (i.e. either Heaven or Hell). Religious experience, it will be argued, usually, if not always, gives recipients of religious experience moral benefits. The giving of moral benefits in religious experience acts to undermine the second purpose we are said to have been given free will and hence generates the incompatibility between free will theodicies and religious experience.","abstract_html":"This thesis suggests a novel problem for theists. This problem is that there is an incompatibility between free will theodicies and religious experience. Free will theodicies are responses to the problem of evil and religious experience is form of interaction between God and people. The free will theodicies that are discussed say that God gives us free will for two purposes. These purposes are to excuse God from direct responsibility for evil in the world and to act as a qualifying factor in who goes where when we die (i.e. either Heaven or Hell). Religious experience, it will be argued, usually, if not always, gives recipients of religious experience moral benefits. The giving of moral benefits in religious experience acts to undermine the second purpose we are said to have been given free will and hence generates the incompatibility between free will theodicies and religious experience.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Matheson, Benjamin"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"m_ph","degree_level":"m_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2010,"date_issued":"2010-07","date_published":"2010-07","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:11:10Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Matheson, Benjamin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2010-07"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2010-07"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["College of Arts & Law","School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Department of Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/811/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["m_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["m_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/811/1/Matheson10MPhil.pdf","http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/811/2/Decl_IS_Matheson10MPhil.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis suggests a novel problem for theists. This problem is that there is an incompatibility between free will theodicies and religious experience. Free will theodicies are responses to the problem of evil and religious experience is form of interaction between God and people. The free will theodicies that are discussed say that God gives us free will for two purposes. These purposes are to excuse God from direct responsibility for evil in the world and to act as a qualifying factor in who goes where when we die (i.e. either Heaven or Hell). Religious experience, it will be argued, usually, if not always, gives recipients of religious experience moral benefits. 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