{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:782"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:782","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Children's mental representation of referential relations : representational partitioning and \"theory of mind\"","abstract":"In six experiments I investigated children’s handling of intensional contexts. The results were described in terms of a developmental extension of Fauconnier’s mental spaces account of meaning representation. Implications for children’s mentalistic development were explored. In chapter 1 I considered the “referential opacity” raised by the representational nature of the mind. I interpreted the findings of Russell (1987) as evidence for a developmental dissociation between handling of intensional contexts - due to the partial nature of representations - and “intentional” referential problems - due to representations being outdated or hypothetical. In experiments 1-3 I demonstrated this dissociation explicitly, and showed that it extended to non-linguistic intensional contexts. Experiments 4 &5 showed correlations between children’s handling of intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, which I explained by their common requirement that representational content be held as partial. Experiment 6 showed that children’s handling of intensional questions (and mentalistic explanations) improved after observing incorrect action on the basis of partial knowledge. This effect of supporting context was short-lived, suggesting that it supported on-line activity not question comprehension. After earlier success with out-dated and hypothetical representations, children’s handling of partial representations at 6-7 years explains their concurrent late success with intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, and constitutes a qualitative change in their representational abilities.","abstract_html":"In six experiments I investigated children’s handling of intensional contexts. The results were described in terms of a developmental extension of Fauconnier’s mental spaces account of meaning representation. Implications for children’s mentalistic development were explored. In chapter 1 I considered the “referential opacity” raised by the representational nature of the mind. I interpreted the findings of Russell (1987) as evidence for a developmental dissociation between handling of intensional contexts - due to the partial nature of representations - and “intentional” referential problems - due to representations being outdated or hypothetical. In experiments 1-3 I demonstrated this dissociation explicitly, and showed that it extended to non-linguistic intensional contexts. Experiments 4 &5 showed correlations between children’s handling of intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, which I explained by their common requirement that representational content be held as partial. Experiment 6 showed that children’s handling of intensional questions (and mentalistic explanations) improved after observing incorrect action on the basis of partial knowledge. This effect of supporting context was short-lived, suggesting that it supported on-line activity not question comprehension. After earlier success with out-dated and hypothetical representations, children’s handling of partial representations at 6-7 years explains their concurrent late success with intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, and constitutes a qualitative change in their representational abilities.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Apperly, Ian"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"d_ph","degree_level":"d_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2000,"date_issued":"2000-07","date_published":"2000-07","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:11:10Z","subjects":["BF Psychology"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Apperly, Ian"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2000-07-13"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2000-07"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["School of Psychology"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/782/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["d_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["d_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["BF Psychology"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/782/1/Apperly00PhD.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In six experiments I investigated children’s handling of intensional contexts. The results were described in terms of a developmental extension of Fauconnier’s mental spaces account of meaning representation. Implications for children’s mentalistic development were explored. In chapter 1 I considered the “referential opacity” raised by the representational nature of the mind. I interpreted the findings of Russell (1987) as evidence for a developmental dissociation between handling of intensional contexts - due to the partial nature of representations - and “intentional” referential problems - due to representations being outdated or hypothetical. In experiments 1-3 I demonstrated this dissociation explicitly, and showed that it extended to non-linguistic intensional contexts. Experiments 4 &5 showed correlations between children’s handling of intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, which I explained by their common requirement that representational content be held as partial. Experiment 6 showed that children’s handling of intensional questions (and mentalistic explanations) improved after observing incorrect action on the basis of partial knowledge. This effect of supporting context was short-lived, suggesting that it supported on-line activity not question comprehension. After earlier success with out-dated and hypothetical representations, children’s handling of partial representations at 6-7 years explains their concurrent late success with intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, and constitutes a qualitative change in their representational abilities."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Children's mental representation of referential relations : representational partitioning and \"theory of mind\""]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["na"],"dc:creator":["Apperly, Ian"],"dc:date":["2000-07-13"],"dc:date.issued":["2000-07"],"dc:description.abstract":["In six experiments I investigated children’s handling of intensional contexts. The results were described in terms of a developmental extension of Fauconnier’s mental spaces account of meaning representation. Implications for children’s mentalistic development were explored. In chapter 1 I considered the “referential opacity” raised by the representational nature of the mind. I interpreted the findings of Russell (1987) as evidence for a developmental dissociation between handling of intensional contexts - due to the partial nature of representations - and “intentional” referential problems - due to representations being outdated or hypothetical. In experiments 1-3 I demonstrated this dissociation explicitly, and showed that it extended to non-linguistic intensional contexts. Experiments 4 &5 showed correlations between children’s handling of intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, which I explained by their common requirement that representational content be held as partial. Experiment 6 showed that children’s handling of intensional questions (and mentalistic explanations) improved after observing incorrect action on the basis of partial knowledge. This effect of supporting context was short-lived, suggesting that it supported on-line activity not question comprehension. After earlier success with out-dated and hypothetical representations, children’s handling of partial representations at 6-7 years explains their concurrent late success with intensional contexts and linguistic ambiguity, and constitutes a qualitative change in their representational abilities."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/782/1/Apperly00PhD.pdf"],"dc:publisher.department":["School of Psychology"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Birmingham"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/782/"],"dc:subject":["BF Psychology"],"dc:title":["Children's mental representation of referential relations : representational partitioning and \"theory of mind\""],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["d_ph"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["d_ph"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:11:10Z"}