{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:1197"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:1197","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Ethics, intentions and judgement-dependence","abstract":"Error-theories and non-cognitivism about ethical discourse face tremendous obstacles, often stemming from their rejection of the truth of ethical assertions. However, I argue in that generic realism about ethical discourse is equally unattractive. Crispin Wright’s judgement-dependence allows for the rejection of generic realism without implausibly rejecting the truth of the distinctive assertions of a discourse. I show how Wright speedily dismisses the judgement-dependence of truth in ethics, but suggest that he has been too quick, ignoring some ways in which a stronger case could have been made in its favour. However, these suggestions do not address the fact that ethical discourse violates one of Wright’s fundamental conditions on judgement-dependent accounts. Wright is able to argue that the ‘grammar’ of intention discourse allows a form of judgement-dependence to be salvaged despite its violation of the conditions on judgement-dependence. The major project of this essay is to investigate the application of this strategy to ethical discourse, although I argue that the strategy must ultimately fail. I suggest why Wright’s strategy worked for intention but not ethics, and conclude that the failure of judgement-dependence for ethics encourages us to seek a plausible judgement-independent account of the discourse.","abstract_html":"Error-theories and non-cognitivism about ethical discourse face tremendous obstacles, often stemming from their rejection of the truth of ethical assertions. However, I argue in that generic realism about ethical discourse is equally unattractive. Crispin Wright’s judgement-dependence allows for the rejection of generic realism without implausibly rejecting the truth of the distinctive assertions of a discourse. I show how Wright speedily dismisses the judgement-dependence of truth in ethics, but suggest that he has been too quick, ignoring some ways in which a stronger case could have been made in its favour. However, these suggestions do not address the fact that ethical discourse violates one of Wright’s fundamental conditions on judgement-dependent accounts. Wright is able to argue that the ‘grammar’ of intention discourse allows a form of judgement-dependence to be salvaged despite its violation of the conditions on judgement-dependence. The major project of this essay is to investigate the application of this strategy to ethical discourse, although I argue that the strategy must ultimately fail. I suggest why Wright’s strategy worked for intention but not ethics, and conclude that the failure of judgement-dependence for ethics encourages us to seek a plausible judgement-independent account of the discourse.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hood, Callum"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"m_ph","degree_level":"m_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2010,"date_issued":"2010-12","date_published":"2010-12","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:11:23Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)","BL Religion","BJ Ethics"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hood, Callum"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2010-12"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2010-12"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["College of Arts & Law","School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Department of Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1197/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["m_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["m_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)","BL Religion","BJ Ethics"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1197/1/Decl_IS_Hood_10_MPhil.pdf","http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1197/2/Hood_10_MPhil.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Error-theories and non-cognitivism about ethical discourse face tremendous obstacles, often stemming from their rejection of the truth of ethical assertions. However, I argue in that generic realism about ethical discourse is equally unattractive. Crispin Wright’s judgement-dependence allows for the rejection of generic realism without implausibly rejecting the truth of the distinctive assertions of a discourse. I show how Wright speedily dismisses the judgement-dependence of truth in ethics, but suggest that he has been too quick, ignoring some ways in which a stronger case could have been made in its favour. However, these suggestions do not address the fact that ethical discourse violates one of Wright’s fundamental conditions on judgement-dependent accounts. Wright is able to argue that the ‘grammar’ of intention discourse allows a form of judgement-dependence to be salvaged despite its violation of the conditions on judgement-dependence. The major project of this essay is to investigate the application of this strategy to ethical discourse, although I argue that the strategy must ultimately fail. I suggest why Wright’s strategy worked for intention but not ethics, and conclude that the failure of judgement-dependence for ethics encourages us to seek a plausible judgement-independent account of the discourse."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Ethics, intentions and judgement-dependence"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["na"],"dc:creator":["Hood, Callum"],"dc:date":["2010-12"],"dc:date.issued":["2010-12"],"dc:description.abstract":["Error-theories and non-cognitivism about ethical discourse face tremendous obstacles, often stemming from their rejection of the truth of ethical assertions. However, I argue in that generic realism about ethical discourse is equally unattractive. Crispin Wright’s judgement-dependence allows for the rejection of generic realism without implausibly rejecting the truth of the distinctive assertions of a discourse. I show how Wright speedily dismisses the judgement-dependence of truth in ethics, but suggest that he has been too quick, ignoring some ways in which a stronger case could have been made in its favour. However, these suggestions do not address the fact that ethical discourse violates one of Wright’s fundamental conditions on judgement-dependent accounts. Wright is able to argue that the ‘grammar’ of intention discourse allows a form of judgement-dependence to be salvaged despite its violation of the conditions on judgement-dependence. The major project of this essay is to investigate the application of this strategy to ethical discourse, although I argue that the strategy must ultimately fail. 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