Transnational Network of Autocrats. Study of Democratic Erosion
This thesis investigates the systematic erosion of democratic institutions under personalist leadership amidst a documented global decline in democracy. It addresses the central question of how elected leaders dismantle institutional safeguards to establish authoritarian rule and examines the extent to which these strategies reflect transnational patterns. Through a comparative analysis of Hungary under Viktor Orbán and the United States during Trump’s second term, the research identifies a pattern of democratic decline that is neither abrupt nor isolated, but rather gradual and transnational in scope. The study draws on theories of personalist politics, competitive authoritarianism, and transnational kleptocracy to analyze the mechanisms by which ruling parties are transformed into vehicles for individual ambition, checks and balances are weakened, and media environments are captured. The Hungarian case demonstrates how incremental legal reforms, party restructuring, and the cultivation of polarization can hollow out democratic institutions while maintaining a facade of legitimacy. The U.S. case reveals how similar tactics, accelerated through executive actions, regulatory retaliation, and attacks on independent institutions, can rapidly erode democratic norms even in long established democracies. The findings underscore that modern democratic backsliding is driven by elected leaders who exploit legal and institutional frameworks, foster polarization, and leverage transnational networks of support. By systematically tracing these processes, the thesis contributes to a broader understanding of how competitive authoritarian regimes emerge and persist, and highlights the urgent need for proactive strategies to defend democratic institutions against the evolving playbook of elected strongmen.
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