Presidential power and constitutional public administration.

This dissertation examines the relationship between the American presidency and the federal bureaucracy from the perspective of the constellation of power created by the Constitution. It argues that the centrality of presidential power in discussions of bureaucratic management and oversight is the result of a misunderstanding of the separation of powers promulgated and institutionalized during the Progressive-Era in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Viewing the separation of powers as primarily a system of checks and balances that inhibited effective government, thinkers and politicians of this period sought to circumvent political deadlock they thought consequent of this system through the creation of quasi-independent federal bureaucracy overseen by the executive. This view of the separation of powers was, however, fundamentally at odds with the theory’s actual operation within the American constitutional order. Consequently, the New Deal’s creation of a vast federal bureaucratic apparatus—though responding to legitimate needs—was predicated upon an understanding of the separation of powers that clashed with the way power was structured under the Constitution. Thus, while the New Deal presented bureaucratic oversight and management as the prerogative of the president, this situation set the stage for perpetual disruption to the constitutional order. Through a series of historical “most-likely” crucial case studies, this dissertation demonstrates how the formalistic understanding of the separation of powers upon which the president’s authority over the bureaucracy is predicated has resulted in path-dependent cycle of perpetual disruption. Concluding with a study of the first and second Trump administrations, the dissertation demonstrates that continual disruption can lead to regime threatening constitutional crises. The dissertation argues that it is only a return to a genuinely constitutional understanding of public administration that could break the path dependency that the formalistic misunderstanding of the separation of powers has created.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Grantor

Baylor University.

Year dc:date.issued

2026

Author dc:creator

• Natali, Joseph Karol, 1997-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Kleinerman, Benjamin A.

• Modern presidency.
• Presidency.
• American politics.
• Public administration.
• Franklin D. Roosevelt.
• United States Constitution.
• Jimmy Carter.
• Dwight D. Eisenhower.
• Bill Clinton.
• Ronald Reagan.
• Donald Trump.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2104/14983

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/14983